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The Limits of Administrative Guidance in the
Interpretation of Tax Treaties
Michael S. Kirsch*
This Article addresses the increasingly important role of administrative
guidance in interpreting the United States' international treaty obligations. The
relationship between administrative guidance and treaties raises important is-
sues at the intersection of international law, constitutional law, and
administrative law.
These issues are explored in the context of the United States' extensive tax
treaty network. Tax treaties play an important role in a global economy; they
attempt to reconcile the complex and ever-changing internal tax laws of different
countries. The Treasury Department is considering the increased use of admin-
istrative guidance to interpret the meaning and application of tax treaties,
particularly in response to the increasingly sophisticated business structures and
cross-border transactions utilized by multinational corporations.
This Article considers the weight that courts should give to unilateral
administrative guidance when interpreting tax treaties. The Article concludes
that the Treasury's traditional, ad hoc approach based on informal technical
explanations is entitled to little, if any, deference in interpreting previously ne-
gotiated bilateral agreements between sovereign nations. However, the Article
identifies certain limited circumstances where formal Treasury regulations might
enable the Treasury Department to influence the application of previously nego-
tiated tax treaties without violating the United States' obligations under these
treaties.
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I. Introduction
With the significant expansion of cross-border economic activity in
recent years, the international aspects of the U.S. tax system have become
increasingly important.' Numerous current and former government officials
have suggested that these international tax issues will drive the next genera-
tion of significant tax reform in Congress. 2 However, unilateral legislation
enacted by one country cannot resolve many of the issues that arise when
multiple countries have legitimate claims to tax income in a cross-border
setting. Instead, countries increasingly rely on tax treaties to resolve these
issues. These treaties serve a dual purpose-they eliminate or mitigate the
potential double taxation that might otherwise arise when a resident of one
country receives income that has a connection to another country, and they
facilitate the sharing of information between the tax authorities of the treaty
countries in order to limit opportunities for tax evasion.
Tax treaties are bilateral treaties that are negotiated directly between
two countries.3 These treaties are not negotiated from scratch, but instead
tend to be based on various model treaties-most often the model treaty de-
veloped by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD Model Treaty),4 as well as model treaties developed by the U.S.
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B., Cornell University, 1985; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1988; LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1989. I would like to
thank Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Mary Ellen O'Connell, Jeffrey Schoenblum, and Martin B. Tittle for
their comments on an earlier draft of this Article and my colleagues who offered suggestions at a
Notre Dame faculty colloquium. I would also like to thank Xiangzhen Liu and Francesc Torrelles
of the Northwestern University School of Law Tax LL.M. Class of 2008 for their research
assistance.
1. See ABA Section of Taxation, Report of the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59
TAX LAW. 649, 657-58 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Task Force Report]; Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing
Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 463-67 (2007) (both sources discussing
globalization and its effect on tax laws).
2. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Congress Likely to Take Closer Look at International Reform,
Kleinbard Says, [2008] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at G-5 (Feb. 13, 2008) (reporting the
comments of Edward Kleinbard, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation); Mark A.
Weinberger, Tax World Remains Dynamic; External Influences Loom, 196 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
at J- 1 (Oct. 11, 2007) (reporting the comments of the former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for
Tax Policy).
3. Although the vast majority of income tax treaties worldwide-including all of the United
States' tax treaties-are bilateral, a small number of multilateral tax treaties exist, most notably
between the Nordic countries. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
4. COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], MODEL TAX
CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL (condensed version 2008). This volume contains the
treaty text, specific commentaries on each treaty article, and an introduction that provides further
interpretive guidance. This Article will refer to these, respectively, as the "OECD Model Treaty,"
the "OECD Model Commentary," and the "OECD Model Treaty," with the citation designating
when it refers to introductory guidance. The OECD is an international organization of thirty
economically developed countries, including the United States, that focuses on economic policy




Treasury Department. 5  As a result, each of the more than sixty U.S. tax
treaties in force 6 generally shares a common structure containing many simi-
lar or identical provisions. Nonetheless, each tax treaty is negotiated
separately in order to address issues that arise from the specific interaction of
the two countries' tax laws and to address particular tax policies that might
be important to one of the countries. 7 As a result, variations exist among ac-
tual U.S. tax treaties and between particular U.S. tax treaties and the OECD
Model Treaty.
8
This widespread U.S. tax treaty network raises significant issues in a
world where cross-border transactions and business structures change
rapidly, and where multinational corporate taxpayers increasingly rely on
aggressive tax planning-including treaty-based planning-to reduce their
overall tax costs.9 The OECD (with U.S. participation) frequently revises
and updates the text of the OECD Model Treaty to reflect new global eco-
nomic developments and increasingly sophisticated methods of tax
5. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, 1
Tax Treaties (CCH) 209 (Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY]. The 2006 U.S.
Model Treaty updated and revised an earlier Model Treaty published by the Treasury Department in
1996. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION, I Tax
Treaties (CCH) 210 (Sept. 20, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 U.S. MODEL TREATY]. Both the 2006 U.S.
Model Treaty and the 1996 U.S. Model Treaty closely parallel the OECD Model Treaty but contain
some differences that reflect the preferred treaty policy of the United States regarding certain issues.
E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996, 1 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 215, tit. & pmbl. (1996) [hereinafter 1996 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION].
6. See IRS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 901, U.S. TAX TREATIES (2008)
[hereinafter IRS REPORT], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p90l.pdf (summarizing the
provisions of the tax treaties currently in force). In addition to this network of income tax treaties,
the United States is also a party to bilateral estate tax treaties, gift tax treaties, or both, with fifteen
countries and an income tax treaty protocol with Canada addressing estate tax issues. See generally
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Bilateral Transfer Tax Treaties, Tax Mgmt. Portfolios (BNA) No. 851
(reproducing the transfer tax treaties currently in force). Note that the treaty with Sweden has been
repealed. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Press Release, U.S. Terminates Estate and Gift Tax Treaty
with Sweden, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp463.htm. This Article focuses on income tax
treaties, and subsequent references to "tax treaties" refer to income tax treaties.
7. 1996 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 5, tit. & pmbl. ("[V]ariations from
the Model text in a particular case may represent a modification that the United States views as
necessary to address a particular aspect of the treaty partner's tax law, or even represent a
substantive concession by the treaty partner in favor of the United States.").
8. The most obvious difference among treaties arises with respect to the maximum tax rate that
the source country can impose on dividends, interest, and royalties derived by a resident of the other
treaty country. For a useful summary of these differing tax rates, see IRS REPORT, supra note 6, at
34 tbl. 1.
9. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 658.
1066 [Vol. 87:1063
2009] The Limits of Administrative Guidance 1067
avoidance and evasion.' ° Less frequently, the U.S. Treasury Department up-
dates the text of the U.S. model treaty."
Of course, modifying the text of a model treaty does not directly amend
the text of the many U.S. tax treaties actually in force. Unlike some nontax
treaties that contain tacit-acceptance procedures,12 no U.S. tax treaty contains
a provision that automatically incorporates subsequent changes to the OECD
Model Treaty. Instead, the United States must take other steps to ensure that
its actual tax treaties keep pace with these developments. The surest way to
make certain that a particular tax treaty addresses new developments is to
renegotiate the treaty. However, in order to update the entire U.S. treaty
network in this manner, the Treasury Department would have to renegotiate
more than sixty separate treaties-a daunting and time-consuming task. At
the other extreme, Congress on occasion has addressed changing develop-
ments by enacting legislation overriding particular provisions of tax treaties,
a step that constitutes a violation of the United States' obligations under the
treaties and, accordingly, is generally discouraged by Treasury Department
officials. 
13
Given the difficulty in updating the text of tax treaties to specifically
address every modem development, significant pressure is placed on inter-
preting existing treaties in the context of these developments. In recent
years, tax administrators have become more aggressive in using
administrative-type interpretations to address ever-changing global economic
10. See OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, intro., para. 9 ("In 1991, recognizing that the
revision of the Model Convention and the commentaries had become an ongoing process, the
Committee on Fiscal Affairs adopted the concept of an ambulatory Model Convention providing
periodic and more timely updates and amendments without waiting for a complete revision.").
11. The Treasury Department published a model tax treaty in 1981 and subsequently withdrew
it in 1992. 1996 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 5, tit. & pmbl. It published a
new Model Treaty in 1996 and again in 2006. See supra note 5.
12. See, e.g., International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47,
1184 U.N.T.S. 276. Under that Convention, an amendment automatically enters into force unless a
specified percentage of contracting states object to the amendment within a certain length of time.
Id. art. VIII. Given the political and economic importance of tax policy, it is highly unlikely that the
United States would agree that future modifications to the OECD Model Treaty would be binding
with respect to existing U.S. bilateral tax treaties. Indeed, the U.S. Senate was reluctant to approve
the U.S.-Austria income tax treaty that contained a much more benign provision (in its
accompanying memorandum of understanding) stating that the OECD Commentary, as it may be
revised from time to time, constitutes a means of interpretation under the Vienna Convention. See
infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. The Senate ultimately gave its consent to the treaty only
with the explicit understanding (reflected in the ratification instruments) that subsequent OECD
Commentary would not apply to the extent that the United States entered a reservation or
observation with respect to that item. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 122-35 and accompanying text. Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah has argued
that the seriousness of the tax-treaty-override problem has been exaggerated and that in limited
circumstances such overrides may be an appropriate way of preventing taxpayers from abusing tax
treaties, particularly because "[tax treaties are too cumbersome to renegotiate every time taxpayers
find a new way to abuse the treaty." Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Treaty Overrides: A Qualified
Defence of U.S. Practice, in 2 TAX TREATIES AND DOMESTIC LAW 65, 79, 65-80 (Guglielmo
Maisto ed., 2006).
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developments. This administrative-type guidance has arisen in several
contexts. At the international level, the OECD publishes guidance in the
form of commentaries, which are intended to aid in interpreting the provi-
sions of the OECD Model Treaty and, indirectly, the actual treaties that are
based on that model. 14 The OECD Commentaries are updated from time to
time to reflect evolving consensus among the member OECD countries re-
garding the meaning of particular Model Treaty provisions in the context of
evolving global business practices. 
15
Within the United States, the principal administrative treaty guidance
takes the form of technical explanations published by the Treasury
Department. At a general level, the Treasury Department has published a
model technical explanation to accompany both its 1996 Model Treaty and
its 2006 Model Treaty. 16 Unlike the regular periodic updates of the OECD
Commentaries, the Treasury Department traditionally does not issue interim
updates to its model technical explanations to reflect business-practice devel-
opments or changes to U.S. treaty policy. At a more specific level, the
Treasury Department issues a technical explanation with respect to each ac-
tual treaty that it negotiates. 17 Accordingly, dozens of these treaty-specific
technical explanations exist, and while they share much in common with
each other and with the model technical explanations, the differences among
them raise significant questions of treaty interpretation.
The Treasury Department is also considering the more widespread use
of other types of administrative guidance, including Treasury regulations, to
interpret treaties. A Treasury Department official recently noted that
"[t]axpayers have requested more guidance on broad treaty issues.., that cut
across treaties," and "'[w]e understand there is a need for more
guidance' . .. [and] the government is considering the best way to issue that
guidance-whether through revenue rulings, regulations, or in some other
form."'18 The official concluded that "'[riegulations may be the best way to
achieve consistency and uniformity with respect to these issues.""' 9
14. See OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, intro., para. 3 ("Member countries... should
conform to this Model Convention as interpreted by the Commentaries .... ).
15. See id. intro., para. 9 (discussing the introduction of an "ambulatory Model Convention" to
respond to the need for constant revision).
16. 1996 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 5; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
UNITED STATES MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION ACCOMPANYING THE UNITED STATES MODEL
INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOv. 15, 2006, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 215 (2006) [hereinafter 2006
U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION].
17. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SIGNED
AT WASHINGTON ON DEC. 14, 1998, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 3285 (Oct. 27, 1999).
18. Lisa M. Nadal, More Generic Treaty Guidance Likely in Next Business Plan, IRS Official
Says, 2008 TAX NOTES TODAY 92-32, available at 2008 TNT 92-32 (Lexis) (paraphrasing and
quoting Michael Mundaca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs).
19. Id. (paraphrasing and quoting Michael Mundaca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Tax Affairs).
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These developments raise significant concerns regarding the weight, if
any, that courts should give to unilateral administrative guidance when inter-
preting a bilateral agreement between two countries. The pressure for this
guidance promises to expand in coming years as the interaction of countries'
tax laws becomes more complicated and multinational corporate taxpayers
become even more sophisticated. In the past few years, several scholars-
primarily outside the United States-have focused on the relevance of
ambulatory20 OECD Commentaries as a means of treaty interpretation under
international law. 21 Less attention has been given to evolving forms of U.S.
administrative guidance under U.S. legal principles. This Article attempts
to remedy that situation.
This Article addresses the limits of unilateral Treasury Department
administrative guidance in interpreting treaties under international law,
constitutional law, and administrative-law principles. Part II of the Article
provides background information regarding the U.S. tax treaty network and
the various types of administrative guidance that might be relevant in inter-
preting the treaties. It discusses the reasons why tax administrators might
utilize ambulatory guidance to interpret tax treaties, but also illustrates the
practical complications that can arise from such an approach. Part III dis-
cusses general treaty-interpretation principles under both international law
and U.S. law, and provides a framework for addressing the role of adminis-
trative guidance. Part IV applies these principles to Treasury Department
technical explanations, the most common form of administrative treaty
guidance, concluding that neither the U.S. model technical explanations nor
specific treaties' technical explanations provide an effective ambulatory ve-
hicle for interpreting previously negotiated treaties. Part V then considers
20. The OECD Commentaries are often referred to as "ambulatory" because they are
continuously reexamined and modified to reflect changing developments. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON THE MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION RELEASED BY THE
TREASURY ON NOv. 15, 2006, at 4 (2007) [hereinafter NYSBA REPORT], available at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/ 127rpt.pdf ("The
technical explanations of the U.S. model treaties, like their OECD counterpart, are 'ambulatory' in
the sense that they reflect developments."); Michael J. McIntyre, Comments on the OECD Proposal
for Secret and Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 622, 645
(2006) (questioning "so-called ambulatory" use of OECD Commentaries).
2 1. A study by the Canadian Branch of the International Fiscal Association summarizes recent
scholarship. DAVID A. WARD ET AL., INT'L FISCAL ASS'N, THE INTERPRETATION OF INCOME TAX
TREATIES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE COMMENTARIES ON THE OECD MODEL (2005)
[hereinafter IFA STUDY].
22. Several authors have published useful overviews addressing the interpretation of tax treaties
under U.S. law, including some aspects of administrative guidance. See, e.g., Robert Thornton
Smith, Tax Treaty Interpretation by the Judiciary, 49 TAX LAW. 845 (1996); John A. Townsend,
Tax Treaty Interpretation, 55 TAX LAW. 219 (2001). Several authors have also focused specifically
on the recent decision in National Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States, 512 F.3d 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), which addressed the applicability of a Treasury regulation in interpreting a tax treaty
with the United Kingdom. E.g., Richard L. Reinhold & Catherine A. Harrington, What NatWest




more formal types of administrative guidance-in particular, Treasury
regulations-and identifies the limited circumstances where Treasury might
use regulatory guidance as a means to affect the application of existing tax
treaties in order to keep pace with ever-changing developments in the global
economy.
II. The Allure of Ambulatory Administrative Guidance
A. The Tax Treaty Process
When a resident of one country derives income from another country,
both the country of residence and the country in which the income arises (the
source country) may tax that income.23 The principal purpose of tax treaties
is to mitigate this potential for double taxation and thereby remove an im-
24
portant potential obstacle to global commerce. A secondary purpose of tax
treaties is to facilitate information sharing between countries' tax authorities,
thereby strengthening the enforcement of each country's tax laws and pre-
venting tax evasion.25
Tax treaties mitigate the potential for double taxation by delineating the
circumstances under which the residence and source countries may impose
tax on various types of income. For example, tax treaties generally prevent
the source country from taxing the business income of a resident of the other
country unless the business income is attributable to a permanent establish-
ment in the source country.26 With respect to passive investment income,
such as dividends and interest, tax treaties generally cap the maximum tax
rate that the source country can impose.27 Tax treaties also contain numerous
23. ALI, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES
INCOME TAXATION II: PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON UNITED STATES INCOME
TAX TREATIES 1-2 (1992) [hereinafter ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT].
24. Id. at 5.
25. See OECD MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, commentary on art. 1, para. 7 ("It is also a
purpose of tax conventions to prevent tax avoidance and evasion."). This twofold purpose of tax
treaties is highlighted by the official titles of many income tax treaties. For example, the suggested
title of treaties based on the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty is "Convention Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of_ for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income." See 2006 U.S. MODEL
TREATY, supra note 5, intro. (emphasis added).
26. See, e.g., OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 7(1) (providing the permanent-
establishment threshold to determine whether business income may be taxed in its country of
origin).
27. See, e.g., id. art. 10(2) (capping the source-country tax rate at the "reasonable" maximum
figure of either 5% or 15%, depending on various other circumstances); id. art. 11(2) (limiting the
maximum source-country tax rate on interest to 10%); id. art. 12 (forbidding the source country
from taxing royalties as income). Unlike the 10% source-country tax allowed on interest income by
the OECD Model Treaty, the U.S. Model Treaty does not allow any source-country tax on interest
income. See 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 11 (allowing only the state of residence
to tax most forms of interest income).
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other provisions that clarify these general principles and address other types
of income.28
As noted above, bilateral income tax treaties are not negotiated from
scratch. Instead, they are based on various model tax treaties, most notably
the OECD Model Treaty. Indeed, more than 1,500 bilateral income tax trea-
ties worldwide, including more than sixty U.S. tax treaties, are largely based
on the OECD Model Treaty. 29 While the U.S. Treasury Department pub-
lishes a U.S. model treaty, that model itself is based on the OECD Model
Treaty, with some departures intended to reflect the United States' preferred
tax policy regarding certain issues.30 Similarly, the United Nations has pub-
lished a model income tax treaty that is based on the general structure of the
OECD Model Treaty, although the U.N. Model Treaty generally plays a less
important role in U.S. treaty negotiations.31
The U.S. tax treaty network does not remain static, but instead is
constantly evolving. The United States frequently renegotiates its existing
treaties to reflect ever-changing developments in the global economy 32 and
seeks to enter into new treaties with an expanding list of countries. For
28. See, e.g., OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 15 (dealing with all income derived
from employment); id. art. 16 (addressing directors fees); id. art. 18 (limiting the source-country
taxation of pensions); id. art. 20 (limiting the taxation of scholarships); id. art. 20 (providing a
residual catchall provision for all forms of income not specifically addressed in the other articles).
29. See OECD, About Tax Treaties, http://www.oecd.org/about/0,3347,en_2649_33747_1_1_1
1 37427,00.html ("Most bilateral tax treaties follow both the principles and the detailed provisions
of the OECD Model. There are close to 350 treaties between OECD Member countries and over
1500 world-wide which are based on the Model, and it has had considerable influence on the
bilateral treaties between non-member countries."); see also OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4,
intro., paras. 12-14 (exploring the history and influence of the OECD Model Treaty over time);
U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, U.N. MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION
BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, intro., para. 9, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102, U.N.
Sales No. E.80.XVI.3 (1980) [hereinafter U.N. MODEL TREATY] (explaining that the U.N. drafters
had decided to use the OECD Model Treaty as their main reference text for their own Model
Treaty). While almost all of these treaties represent bilateral agreements between two countries, a
few countries-most notably the Nordic countries-are parties to a multilateral income tax treaty.
See OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, intro., para. 38 (describing the Nordic Convention on
Income and Capital).
30. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31. See U.N. MODEL TREATY, supra note 29, intro., para. 9 (describing how the U.N. drafters
incorporated various provisions of the OECD Model Treaty); see also OECD MODEL TREATY,
supra note 4, intro., para. 14 (noting that the OECD Model Treaty "has been used as the basis for
the original drafting and the subsequent revision of the United Nations Model Double Taxation
Convention"). The U.N. Model, which is intended to reflect the tax-policy concerns of some less
economically developed countries, plays only a limited role in U.S. tax treaty negotiations, in part
because the OECD Model Treaty and OECD Commentary thereon were amended in 1997 to
include the positions of a number of less economically developed non-OECD countries. See id.
(discussing the addition of the positions of non-OECD countries).
32. The most notable example of this constant evolution is the U.S. income tax treaty with
Canada, the United States' largest trading partner, which has been amended five times in the past
twenty-five years. For the most recent protocol, see Protocol Amending the Convention with




example, in the past five years alone, the United States has renegotiated or
signed new treaties with more than a dozen countries.33
Although each U.S. tax treaty in force generally is based on a model
treaty, each treaty must be negotiated separately in order to address issues
that arise from the specific interaction of the two countries' tax laws, to ad-
dress particular tax policies that might be important to one of the countries,
and to reflect general tax treaty policy developments since the publication of
the model. 34 As a result, treaty negotiations involve a give-and-take between
the two countries, with the final text sometimes reflecting a compromise ra-
ther than the model language. 35 The U.S. Treasury Department represents
the United States during these tax treaty negotiations.36
Depending on a variety of factors, including the complexity of issues
arising during negotiation and the level of each country's enthusiasm for
completing the treaty, the treaty-making process can be relatively quick or
can be very lengthy. Among the more rapid negotiations, the U.S.-Slovenia
tax treaty was signed seven months after negotiations began.37 In contrast,
the current efforts to renegotiate the U.S.-Hungary treaty began in 2001 and
have not yet been completed,38 despite the high priority of this negotiation
from the United States' perspective. 39 As an extreme example, the United
States and Brazil have engaged periodically in tax treaty negotiations since
1947 but are still not close to agreement due to differences between the two
countries on certain fundamental issues.
40
33. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Tax Treaty Documents, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/treaties.shtml (last updated Jan. 14, 2009) (providing a list and copies of current U.S. tax
treaties and protocols).
34. See ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 3-5 (describing how the United States
will balance its own interests against the interests of the other country during treaty negotiations).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 16-22 (describing the process of treaty negotiation, consent, and ratification).
37. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Slovenia, United States to Begin Income Tax
Treaty Negotiations (Oct. 23, 1998), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/rr2771.htm
(announcing the November 30, 1998 commencement of negotiations); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury, U.S.-Slovenia Sign Income Tax Treaty (June 21, 1999), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/rr3213.htm (announcing the June 21, 1999 signing).
38. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, U.S., Hungary Set to Negotiate New Income
Tax Treaty (Jan. 19, 2001), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/Isl137.htm
(announcing the March 5, 2001 commencement of negotiations); see also Nadal, supra note 18
(mentioning the still ongoing negotiation process).
39. This delay apparently is due to Hungary's lack of enthusiasm for including a "limitation on
benefits" provision in a revised treaty, as the current U.S.-Hungary treaty is one of the few
remaining U.S. treaties without such a provision. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON EARNINGS STRIPPING, TRANSFER PRICING AND U.S. INCOME TAX TREATIES 82-88
(2007) (describing the extensive, aggressive use of the current treaty by Hungarian entities due to
the absence of a limitation-on-benefits provision, and the Treasury's efforts to end this practice by
adding a limitation provision to the new treaty).
40. See Nadal, supra note 18 (highlighting the problems in reaching a tax treaty agreement with
Brazil).
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After the Treasury Department concludes negotiations with the other
country and the treaty text is signed, the treaty is forwarded by the President
to the Senate.4' In anticipation of the Senate approval process, the Treasury
Department prepares a technical explanation of the proposed treaty, which
usually is sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to that
Committee's hearings on the proposed treaty.42 Although the other country's
negotiators may be aware of the most recently published U.S. model tech-
nical explanation,43 they generally are not consulted when the Treasury
Department, after the treaty has been negotiated and signed, prepares that
treaty's technical explanation. 44 While a copy of the particular treaty's tech-
nical explanation may be sent to representatives of the other treaty country
after it is completed and sent to the Senate, the other country generally is not
involved in the preparation of the technical explanation, and its formal ap-
proval of the technical explanation is not sought.45
As with nontax treaties, U.S. tax treaties require the advice and consent
of the Senate pursuant to a two-thirds vote.4 6 As part of the approval process,
the Senate sometimes attaches reservations to its approval, in which case the
other country's agreement to that reservation must be sought before instru-
ments of ratification are exchanged.47 After the Senate gives its consent, the
treaty enters into force once the Executive Branch and the other country ex-
change instruments of ratification.48 In the United States, tax treaties are
treated as self-executing, and therefore they do not need separate domestic
legislation to make them effective.49
41. See ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 15-16 (articulating the roles of the
Executive and Legislative Branches in the process of creating tax treaties).
42. See id. at 18 (describing the use of technical explanations in the tax-treaty-making process).
43. The Model Technical Explanations are publicly available on the Treasury Department's
Web site. Tax Treaty Documents, supra note 33.
44. See ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 18 (noting that the creation of technical
explanations is generally a unilateral process).
45. The principal exception to this unilateral approach involves recent treaty protocols with
Canada, where the Treasury Department and Canadian tax authorities have agreed to a joint
technical explanation. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
47. See ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 19 (explaining the effect of the Senate
attaching reservations). A Senate reservation might further delay, or sometimes derail, the treaty.
For example, in 1999 the Senate attached a reservation to its approval of both the Italy and Slovenia
tax treaties, objecting to certain antiabuse provisions in the treaty text. Philip R. West, Antiabuse
Rules and Policy: Coherence or Tower of Babel?, 49 TAX NOTES INT'L 1161 (2008), available at
49 Tax Notes Int'l 1161 (Lexis). While Slovenia agreed to remove those provisions and the treaty
is now in force, Italy did not, so the U.S.-Italy treaty signed in 1999 still has not entered into force.
See IRS, Italy Tax Treaty Documents, http://irs.gov/businesses/intemational/article/O,,id=
169601,00.html (last updated Apr. 30, 2008) (displaying the most recent tax treaty with Italy, which
was ratified in 1984).
48. See ALI TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 21-22 (outlining the requirement of the
exchange of instruments of ratification).
49. See id. at 22 (distinguishing the U.S. system, where treaties are self-executing, with systems
in other countries); see also Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1393 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(listing self-executing treaties). Professor Van Alstine also notes that tax treaties contain self-
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B. Technical Explanations and Other Guidance
As noted above, each new treaty's technical explanation generally is
based on the Treasury Department's then-current model technical
explanation, 50 at least to the extent that the relevant treaty language follows
the model treaty text. The Treasury Department does not explicitly identify
instances where a particular technical explanation differs from the model
technical explanation or from other treaties' technical explanations, nor does
it provide an explanation for such changes. 51  Instead, these differences
usually are evident only by comparing the wording of a particular treaty's
technical explanation with the wording of another treaty's technical explana-
tion or the model.52
Numerous differences among various recent treaty-specific technical
explanations and the 2006 Model Technical Explanation have been
identified.53 For example, in interpreting treaty language that addresses the
relationship between the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) and the treaty at
hand, the recent technical explanations published in connection with the new
executing provisions. Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 892, 923 (2004). Although he cites various tax treaty technical explanations,
those cited references to self-execution do not refer to self-execution as generally understood;
instead, they refer to a taxpayer's ability to claim certain benefits under the treaty without the need
for advance approval from the Internal Revenue Service. Nonetheless, Professor Van Alstine's
general assertion that tax treaties are self-executing is consistent with the long-understood view.
Indeed, taxpayers have been claiming the benefits provided by tax treaties for decades without any
explicit domestic implementing legislation, with the express knowledge of both Congress and the
Treasury Department. See Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 591 n.62 (2007)
(citing cases spanning from 1946 to 1989 where courts "directly enforce[d] treaties without even
discussing whether they [were] 'self-executing"'). As a practical matter, taxpayers generally have
no incentive to challenge tax treaties as non-self-executing because tax treaties generally provide
benefits that otherwise would not be available under the Internal Revenue Code. But see Lidas, Inc.
v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that, in the context of an effort to
quash a summons issued pursuant to a tax treaty with no implementing legislation, taxpayers lacked
standing to challenge the income tax treaty as non-self-executing).
50. See 2006 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 16. The 2006 Model
Technical Explanation superseded the Model Technical Explanation accompanying the 1996 U.S.
Model Treaty. NYSBA REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.
51. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 20, at 2. The report notes:
It is not possible to understand what is new [in the 2006 Model Treaty and Technical
Explanation] except by a painful side-by-side comparison of the two model treaties
and the respective technical explanations; or, in many cases, to understand why the
changes were made. It is sometimes difficult, therefore, to put provisions of the 2006
Model in a meaningful context.
Id.
52. Id. For a detailed comparison of the text of the 1996 U.S. Model Treaty and the 2006 U.S.
Model Treaty, see JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, U.S. CONG., COMPARISON OF THE UNITED
STATES MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996 WITH THE UNITED STATES MODEL
INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF NOV. 15, 2006, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) I 215A (May 8, 2007), and
MARTIN B. TITTLE & REUVEN S. AvI-YONAH, THE INTEGRATED 2006 UNITED STATES MODEL
INCOME TAX TREATY (2008).
53. See NYSBA REPORT, supra note 20, at 4 (questioning how a tax treaty should be
interpreted when language in the model technical explanation differs from the treaty-specific
technical explanation without comment, and citing examples).
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U.S.-Belgium treaty and the U.S.-Germany treaty protocol include language
explicitly describing the application of the so-called "consistency rule" of tax
treaties 54 in the context of calculating a foreign financial institution's busi-
ness profits.55 This explicit language does not appear in either the 2006
Model Technical Explanation or technical explanations of prior treaties. 56 As
another example, the 2006 Model Technical Explanation explicitly states that
guarantee and securities lending fees are covered by the residual "other
income" article of the Model Treaty, although the technical explanations of
many existing treaties do not explicitly address these fees.57
Because the Treasury Department does not provide official explanations
for these and other differences among various treaties' technical explanations
interpreting identical treaty language, it often is not clear why the Treasury
Department made a particular change in the language of the technical expla-
nation even though the underlying treaty text is the same. Possible
explanations include a country-specific interpretation resulting from the ne-
gotiation of that particular treaty; an explicit clarification of the Treasury
Department's already-existing (but not yet published) views regarding the
interpretation of the treaty language; a change in the Treasury Department's
views of the appropriate interpretation of the treaty language; or a mere sty-
listic change made by the Treasury Department personnel drafting the
technical explanation.58
Modem developments in the global economy have placed increasing
pressure on tax treaty interpretation. Not only has the amount of cross-
border trade and investment affected by treaties increased significantly, but
54. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL
SIGNED AT BERLIN ON JUNE 1, 2006 AMENDING THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND
CAPITAL AND TO CERTAIN OTHER TAXES SIGNED ON 29TH AUGUST 1989 art. I, para. 2 (2007),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/tegermany07.pdf (explaining the
"consistency rule"--that "[a] taxpayer may not.., choose among the provisions of the Code and
the Convention in an inconsistent manner in order to minimize tax").
55. See Letter from Lawrence Uhlick, Inst. of Int'l Bankers, to Eric Solomon, Assistant Sec'y
for Tax Policy (Oct. 1, 2007), reprinted in WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Oct. 5, 2007, 2007 WTD 194-
18 (Lexis) (identifying and expressing concern with inconsistency between technical explanations
in this context).
56. See id. Surprisingly, the technical explanation to the new U.S.-Iceland treaty, which was
published July 10, 2008, does not include the full explanation of the consistency rule that appeared
the year before in the Germany and Belgium technical explanations. U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ICELAND FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF
DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON
INCOME, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 4041, art. 7, para. 2, art. 10, para. 8 (July 10, 2008). However, a
cross-reference in another part of the Iceland technical explanation implies that the same
explanation was intended, leading to uncertainty as to whether the Iceland technical explanation is
consistent with the Germany and Belgium technical explanations on this point. Id.
57. NYSBA REPORT, supra note 20, at 4.
58. See id. at 3-4 (listing sources of confusion from technical explanations of U.S. model
treaties and specific treaties).
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the character and sophistication of these transactions and the underlying
structure of multinational corporate activities has become more complex.
Moreover, multinational corporations and their tax advisors face increasing
pressure to lower tax costs through aggressive tax planning-including
treaty-based planning.59 In addition, both U.S. tax laws affecting interna-
tional transactions and the Treasury Department's preferred tax policy for
dealing with these global developments evolve over time.
It is understandable, then, that the Treasury Department or IRS might
want to issue various types of unilateral administrative guidance addressing
the application of particular tax treaty text to ever-changing circumstances,6 °
just as they periodically issue administrative guidance addressing the appli-
cation of tax statutes. This evolving treaty guidance might take various
forms, such as issuing a new model technical explanation reflecting a new
interpretation, even when the underlying model treaty text has not changed;
incorporating the new interpretation into a subsequent technical explanation
accompanying a new proposed treaty that is sent to the Senate, even though
the proposed treaty's text is the same as that of earlier treaties; issuing a rev-
enue ruling, revenue procedure, or notice reflecting the new interpretation; or
promulgating Treasury regulations that affect the treaty interpretation.6'
This ever-changing administrative guidance raises significant
interpretive questions regarding previously existing treaties. A recent report
on the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty asked (but did not attempt to answer) several
of these questions:
Will changes in the [technical] explanations, and in the evolution of
the meaning given to the same language in different treaties, be taken
into account in the interpretation of prior treaties? ... Or suppose the
treaty specific technical explanation includes items not mentioned in
the [Model] Technical Explanation .... Can these be relied on?
62
While this excerpt asks whether a taxpayer interpreting a previously existing
treaty can rely on a newer technical explanation, thereby implying that the
newer explanation is favorable to the taxpayer, the newer technical explana-
tion might provide an interpretation that is unfavorable to a taxpayer. Under
such circumstances, the corresponding question is whether the taxpayer is
bound by the newer explanation.63
59. See ABA Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 658 (noting that multinational taxpayers have
increased their focus on reducing tax costs).
60. The IRS could also enter into a bilateral agreement with the other country's competent
authority regarding the interpretation of a particular treaty, pursuant to the mutual-agreement-
procedure mechanism of that treaty. 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 25(3).
61. Nadal, supra note 18.
62. NYSBA REPORT, supra note 20, at 4.
63. Cf IFA STUDY, supra note 21, at 107-08 (citing commentators who suggest that, as a
matter of administrative practice, tax administrators should follow ambulatory OECD
Commentaries in interpreting a treaty, even though taxpayers might not be bound by the ambulatory
Commentaries).
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In order to provide a framework for evaluating the weight, if any, to be
given to this changing treaty guidance, Part III discusses relevant theories of
treaty interpretation, under both international law and U.S. law. Part IV then
applies this framework to technical explanations, concluding that a technical
explanation has only limited legal authority in interpreting the treaty for
which it was issued and almost no relevance in interpreting any other treaty.
It also discusses the extent to which the variation among different technical
explanations might provide taxpayers with opportunities to take aggressive
reporting positions. Part V then considers alternative administrative
approaches-in particular, the use of regulations-and concludes that they
might provide some limited ability to ensure that existing treaties keep pace
with ongoing developments in the global economy.
III. Relevant Treaty-Interpretation Principles
While statutory and treaty interpretation share many common
principles, there also are significant differences due to the different natures of
the two authorities.64 Most fundamentally, treaties constitute a negotiated
agreement between the United States and another country (or countries),
whereas statutes are unilaterally created by the United States. In this context,
treaty interpretation, unlike statutory interpretation, raises principles analo-
gous to contract law, as it must reflect the interests of the two parties to the
agreement.65
While general consensus exists that the starting point for treaty
interpretation is the document's text, numerous other factors are often
invoked in treaty interpretation, including the intent of the negotiators and
the purpose of the treaty. As with the analogous debates regarding statutory
and contract interpretation, 66 disagreement exists as to the proper application
of these and other factors.
64. See ALI TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 60 ("The natural tendency of courts to
treat tax treaties like legislative enactments should be resisted.").
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. III, introductory note (1987)
("In some respects, the international law of international agreements resembles domestic contract
law, as international agreements often resemble contracts.... But the international law of
international agreements has its own character, and analogies from the contract law of any particular
country are to be used with caution."). See generally John Norton Moore, Treaty Interpretation, the
Constitution and the Rule of Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 163, 197-205 (2001) (discussing the historical
treatment of treaties as bargains between nations); Curtis J. Mahoney, Note, Treaties as Contracts:
Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 834-38 (2007)
(discussing the historical treatment of treaties as contracts).
66. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. Il, introductory note (1987)
(discussing the analogy between treaty interpretation and contract law).
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A. The Vienna Convention
1. General Principles.-The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties67 (Vienna Convention) is recognized as the authoritative restatement
of international treaty law. 68  The Vienna Convention was signed by the
United States, but the Senate has never given its consent to ratification, and
accordingly the Convention has not yet been ratified by the United States.6 9
Nonetheless, the Department of State has, on numerous occasions, stated that
it views the substantive provisions of the Convention as codifying existing
customary international law that constitutes an authoritative guide to treaty
law and practice. v
The principal interpretive rule of the Vienna Convention states that "[a]
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose.,, 71 This general rule places primary emphasis on
the text of the treaty and looks to the text of other documents only to the ex-
tent they constitute an "agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty ' 72 or
an "instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
",73related to the treaty. In addition, the general rule is willing to look to a
"subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty"74 and "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation., 75 The
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW pt. III, introductory note (1987).
69. Id. (discussing the history of the Vienna Convention).
70. Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, International Legal Authorities,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/authorities/international/index.htm (noting that although the United
States is not legally bound by the Vienna Convention, "[n]evertheless, the United States follows
many of the rules in the [Vienna Convention] in the conduct of its day-to-day work on treaties").
The Restatement acknowledges:
[U]nless the Vienna Convention comes into force for the United States, this section [of
the Restatement, which reflects the interpretive principles of the convention,] does not
strictly govern interpretation by the United States or by courts in the United States.
But it represents generally accepted principles and the United States has also appeared
willing to accept them despite differences of nuance and emphasis.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 325 cmt. a (1987). This acceptance of the
Convention's principles applies only to the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention, not to
the dispute-resolution obligations of the Convention. See id. § 325.
71. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, art. 31(1).
72. Id. art. 31(2)(a).
73. Id. art. 31(2)(b).
74. Id. art. 31(3)(a).
75. Id. art. 31(3)(b).
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general rule is willing to look to "[a] special meaning [of] a term if it is es-
tablished that the parties so intended.,
76
The Vienna Convention, by placing such emphasis on evidence of
agreement between the parties, reflects a strong desire to interpret treaties in
accordance with the shared understanding of the parties. In achieving this
result, the Convention places limitations on the role of supplementary
materials. According to Article 32 of the Convention, supplementary
materials, such as evidence from the negotiations or other preparatory
documents (travaux pr~paratoires), may be looked to if the treaty text is
"ambiguous or obscure [or l]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable. 77 Supplementary materials may also be considered "to con-
firm the meaning resulting from the application of [the general rule] of
article 31.,,78 As a practical matter, these standards give courts significant
leeway to look beyond the treaty text, permitting reference to supplementary
materials both when a court finds the treaty text to be ambiguous and when it
finds the text to be unambiguous (i.e., to confirm the meaning resulting from
the text). Indeed, the International Court of Justice, when interpreting trea-
ties under the Vienna Convention, frequently looks beyond the text of the
document to these supplementary materials.
2. Ambulatory OECD Commentaries.-Under these principles,
ambulatory administrative guidance seems to have little, if any, relevance
under the Vienna Convention in interpreting an existing tax treaty. Although
this Article is concerned primarily with the effect of ambulatory U.S. admin-
istrative guidance on earlier treaties, as an initial matter it is useful to
consider briefly how these Vienna Convention principles apply in the related
phenomenon of ambulatory OECD Commentaries. A group of prominent
international tax scholars, under the auspices of the International Fiscal
Association (IFA), recently published a study of foreign commentators and
foreign case law applying the Vienna Convention principles to the ambula-
tory OECD Commentaries.7 9
After a thorough analysis, the IFA study concludes that ambulatory
updates to the OECD Commentaries are entitled to little weight in
interpreting OECD Model-based tax treaties that were negotiated prior to the
change in the Model Commentary:
In our view, later commentaries that represent a fair interpretation of
the [OECD] Model and that clearly arise from the words of the Model
[e.g., amplification of existing commentary by the addition of new
examples or arguments to what is already there] and that do not
conflict with commentaries current at the time the tax treaty was
76. Id. art. 31 (4).
77. Id. art. 32.
78. Id.
79. IFA STUDY, supra note 21, at78-111.
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negotiated can be given weight as persuasive interpretations by the
[OECD committee responsible for the Model] of the meaning of the
particular Article of the Model but they cannot be considered to have
been adopted by the treaty negotiators for purposes of the particular
tax treaty. The new commentary would not fall within Article 31 [the
general rule] of the Vienna Convention and therefore would only
represent a helpful paraphrase or explanation of what could be said to
be the meaning of the particular Article. Of course, if the
interpretation is clear and unambiguous, the words in the particular tax
treaty do not require references to the commentaries to be
interpreted.8 °
The study then addresses ambulatory commentaries that go even further
than a mere amplification of existing commentaries by adding to what is al-
ready there. 81  For example, it concludes that "there is little or no legal
justification for the use of [new] commentaries where they fill gaps in the
Model by purporting to fill gaps in the commentaries. '8 2 Instead, such gaps
should be addressed by amending the OECD Model Treaty and, with respect
to preexisting treaties, amending those treaties by a protocol or new treaty.
83
With respect to new commentaries that purport to follow state practice under
80. Id. at 80. The IFA study's conclusions reflect the majority view among public international
lawyers and international tax lawyers who have addressed this issue. See David R. Tillinghast,
Commentaries to the OECD Model Convention: Ubiquitous, Often Controversial, But Could They
Possibly Be Legally Binding?, 35 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 580, 581 (2006) (discussing a recent
international conference on this issue, in which a minority of the participants thought that
ambulatory OECD Commentaries "may be legally binding on countries having treaties based on the
OECD Model"). Tillinghast, however, agreed with the majority view that the Commentaries may
have some limited relevance, but that they are not legally binding. See id. at 582.
The OECD Commentaries themselves, without explicitly mentioning the Vienna Convention,
contemplate that ambulatory commentaries will have at least some relevance in interpreting
previously concluded tax treaties that are based on the OECD Model. The introduction to the
Model states that changes or additions to the OECD Commentaries that are not a direct result of
changes to the OECD Model text
are normally applicable to the interpretation and application of conventions concluded
before their adoption, because they reflect the consensus of the OECD Member countries
as to the proper interpretation of existing provisions and their application to specific
situations.
Tax authorities in Member countries follow the general principles enunciated
in the preceding four paragraphs. Accordingly, the Committee on Fiscal
Affairs considers that taxpayers may also find it useful to consult later versions
of the Commentaries in interpreting earlier treaties.
OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, intro., paras. 35, 36.1. According to the former chair of the
committee working party responsible for the OECD Commentaries, this language is aimed at tax
authorities as they interpret treaties. It "'does not, of course, purport to give directions to national
courts.... One might.., expect States to [utilize the revised commentaries,] although this is not
binding on taxpayers, let alone courts."' IFA STUDY, supra note 21, at 83 (citation omitted).
81. IFA STUDY, supra note 21, at 79 (listing Waters's four categories of new commentaries).
For examples of these types of ambulatory commentaries, see id. at 81-94.
82. Id. at 110.
83. Id.
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existing treaties, the IFA study notes that Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention gives weight to such changes only "if these state practices are in
fact adopted by the two states to any particular treaty and if the state practice
'establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation' and is a
genuine interpretation and not effectively a change in the treaty. 84 In this
regard, the study further points out that "a change in the commentaries does
not necessarily evidence a state practice of any particular OECD member
state, or any two member states. ' 85 Finally, with respect to the most aggres-
sive use of ambulatory commentary, the study concludes "that later
commentary contradicting previous commentary should never be taken into
account in interpreting existing treaties. 86
In very limited circumstances, U.S. tax treaty documents explicitly
address the effect of ambulatory OECD Commentary guidance. For
example, the memorandum of understanding (MOU) accompanying the
U.S.-Austria tax treaty states that the tax treaty is based on the OECD Model
Treaty and that the treaty's provisions are "generally... expected to have the
same meaning as expressed in the OECD Commentary.'8 7  More
importantly, the MOU then states that "[t]he [OECD] Commentary-as it
may be revised from time to time--constitutes a means of interpretation in
the sense of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of May 23,
1969." 88 Because the U.S.-Austria MOU itself, which was agreed to by both
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, constitutes "context"
within the meaning of Vienna Convention Article 31(2),89 its explicit refer-
ence to subsequently developed OECD Commentary should make that
ambulatory Commentary relevant in interpreting the U.S.-Austria treaty, at
least to the extent that the United States or Austria did not enter a reservation
or observation with respect to a new OECD Commentary.
90
84. Id.
85. Id. at 111.
86. Id. The IFA study observes that utilizing new commentary that contradicts the commentary
in effect at the time of the negotiation of a preexisting treaty has no relevance "in establishing the
intentions of the parties negotiating particular tax treaties ... and delegate[s] to the [OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs] an international law-making capacity for which there is no support."
Id.
87. Memorandum of Understanding Accompanying the Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-
Austria, May 31, 1996, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 104-31 (1996).
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, art. 31(2); see also supra note 72 and accompanying
text.
90. See IFA STUDY, supra note 21, at 43 n.99 ("The [U.S.-Austria MOUI sentence indicates
that both governments accept the ambulatory effect of the OECD Commentary. If there is an
express understanding between the contracting states which is intended to have legal effect, it
appears that the OECD Commentary can have ambulatory effect in the interpretive process."). The
Senate, during the U.S.-Austria treaty consent process, raised questions regarding the scope of the
MOU's incorporation of ambulatory OECD Commentary. See Townsend, supra note 22, at 289-90
(discussing Senate treatment of the U.S.-Austria tax treaty MOU). Ultimately, the Senate approved
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B. U.S. Case Law
1. In General-Having briefly considered the application of general
international law principles as reflected in the Vienna Convention, the
remainder of this Article focuses on the relevance of Treasury Department
administrative guidance under U.S. judicial precedent. 9' As noted above, the
United States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention. 92 Nonetheless, the
State Department has stated that it views the substantive provisions of the
convention as codifying existing customary international law that constitutes
an authoritative guide to treaty law and practice,93 and U.S. courts generally
look to canons of interpretation similar to those found in the Vienna
Convention. However, U.S. courts have, on occasion, applied treaty-
interpretation principles that differ from those of the Convention. This
Article does not purport to address the broader normative issues regarding
this relationship, which extends well beyond the context of tax treaties.
Rather, it focuses on Supreme Court and other relevant cases to determine
how U.S. courts have treated, and are likely to treat in the future, administra-
tive guidance interpreting tax treaties. Relevant factors that affect a U.S.
court's view of this guidance include a greater willingness of some U.S.
courts to consider supplementary interpretive materials, the relationship be-
tween statutes and treaties under the U.S. Constitution, and institutional
separation of powers under the Constitution.94 The analysis also considers
certain unique aspects of tax treaties that may impact a court's decision.
Parts IV and V then apply these U.S. judicial principles in analyzing the
authoritative weight of technical explanations and regulations in interpreting
U.S. tax treaties.
As a threshold matter, it is important to note that U.S. court decisions
do not necessarily provide a coherent, uniform approach to interpreting tax
the treaty based on the "understanding" that the OECD Commentary would not apply to the extent
the United States entered a reservation or observation to a particular item. Id. This understanding
was included in the ratification instrument ultimately exchanged with Austria. Id.
91. Professor Michael McIntyre has noted that in analyzing tax treaties, it is important to focus
on the interpretive principles of local law, which might differ from the principles of international
law. McIntyre, supra note 20, at 645. In criticizing the overreliance on the OECD's interpretation
of the ambulatory effect of the OECD Commentary under international law principles, Professor
McIntyre noted the importance of interpreting based on the "actual status of the Commentary under
local law, not on the basis of the OECD's preferred treatment of the Commentary under local law."
Id.; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 65 (noting that in the United States, as well as in certain
other countries, "courts are likely to follow domestic law even if it violates international law").
92. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
94. Some commentators have suggested that a further distancing from the Vienna Convention
interpretive principles should exist in the case of self-executing private-law treaties, such as the U.S.
Sales Convention. E.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
687, 706-08 (1998). Unlike those treaties, which focus on the relationship between private parties,
a tax treaty involves the interaction of private parties and a country that is a party to the treaty.
Because the country whose revenue is at issue has a significant interest in the application of a tax
treaty, such arguments do not seem to apply to tax treaties.
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treaties. Various decisions give different emphases to the interplay between
the treaty text, the purpose of the treaty, the intent of the negotiators (as well
as the understanding of the Senators who gave their consent), and what mate-
rials are relevant in analyzing these factors.95
While consensus generally exists that the text of the treaty is of
principal importance, the Supreme Court, consistent with-but not explicitly
relying on-Article 32 of the Vienna Convention,96 looks to supplemental
materials when the text is ambiguous or when a literal application would lead
to manifestly absurd or unreasonable results.97 Of course, this leaves open
the important question of whether the text is ambiguous and whether it pro-
duces absurd or unreasonable results. 98 Indeed, Supreme Court Justices
themselves have often disagreed as to the application of these threshold
standards in specific cases. 99
95. See id. at 743 (noting that "it is difficult to discern any coherence in the Court's approach"
regarding the role of travaux prparatoires).
96. Although this aspect of the Court's approach is consistent with the Vienna Convention
principles, the Court has not explicitly relied on the Vienna Convention regarding these principles.
The Court's only explicit reference to Articles 31 or 32 of the Convention appears in a dissenting
opinion by Justice Blackmun. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. For example, in O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986), Justice Scalia, writing for a
unanimous Court, concluded that a literal reading of a particular paragraph of the Panama Canal
Treaty-which would have exempted U.S. workers in Panama from U.S. taxation-was "utterly
implausible." Id. at 31. Although Justice Scalia reached this conclusion by referring to the
"context" of the treaty, he does not use that term in the same way it is used in Article 31(2) (i.e.,
agreements between the parties or unilateral instruments accepted by the other party). Instead, he
uses the term "context" to include preparatory materials, such as evidence from the negotiations. Id.
at 31 (emphasizing that the exemption of U.S. workers from U.S. taxation "has no foundation in the
negotiations leading to the Agreement"). Although Justice Scalia does not cite to the Vienna
Convention, this use of supplementary materials when a literal interpretation leads to unreasonable
results is consistent with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.
98. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV.
953, 976 (1994) ("[Tjhe problem is that of identifying the proper threshold of ambiguity at which a
treaty interpreter should abandon the terms of the agreement and go in search of extrinsic sources of
meaning.").
99. See id. at 976-80 (comparing Justice Scalia's opinion in O'Connor to his concurrence in
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989)). For example, the Court's decision in Haitian Centers
Council turned on whether the word "return" in the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees was ambiguous. 509 U.S. at 180. The majority concluded that the term, as used in the
protocol, did not have its ordinary, common meaning, whereas Justice Blackmun, in dissent,
concluded that the term was unambiguous. Compare id., with id. at 190 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In the Supreme Court's most recent treaty-interpretation case, the majority opinion viewed its
conclusion (that the treaty was not self-executing) as flowing from the "natural reading" of the
treaty text. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1358 (2008). The majority then referred to
supplementary materials only to confirm this reading. Id. at 1358-60. In contrast, the dissent
asserted that "[t]he majority places too much weight upon treaty language that says little about the
matter." Id. at 1377 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Medellin case might not be directly relevant
regarding the standard for interpreting treaty text, as its principal focus is on self-execution concepts




The Supreme Court has sometimes, in describing the threshold for
looking to supplemental materials, used more lenient terms than those ap-
pearing in the Vienna Convention.'00 For example, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Stuart101 (involving the 1942 U.S.-Canada income tax
treaty), observed that "[t]he clear import of treaty language controls unless
application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning ef-
fects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signatories"'o0
2
(in contrast to the "manifestly absurd or unreasonable" standard used in the
Vienna Convention'0 3). Nonetheless, given the practical ease with which the
Vienna Convention allows courts to resort to supplementary materials, this
difference in the stated standard might be of little import.
U.S. courts have looked to a wide range of supplementary materials to
illuminate the shared understanding of the United States and its treaty
partners. 10 4  Direct evidence of shared understanding may include material
from the negotiation history'0 5 or examples of the postratification application
of the treaty by both parties. 10 6 Courts are also willing to find implicit shared
100. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 325 cmt. g (1987)
("Courts in the United States are generally more willing than those of other states to look outside
the instrument to determine its meaning."); Bederman, supra note 98, at 965 ("American courts are
frequently accused of being too quick to look behind the text of a treaty and thus to ignore the plain
meaning of the words.").
101. 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
102. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 365-66 (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,
180 (1982) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)) (emphasis added). After briefly
discussing the treaty language, the Stuart court then analyzed the treaty's ratification history and
subsequent operation, noting that "[nlontextual sources ... often assist us in 'giving effect to the
intent of the Treaty parties."' Id. at 366 (citation omitted).
103. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
104. See Schoenblum, supra note 6, pt. V(C) (providing examples of a variety of sources U.S.
courts have considered).
105. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d 647, 654, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing
affidavits from the negotiators of the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty); see also Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct.
1346, 1357, 1357-58 (2008) ("Because a treaty ratified by the United States is 'an agreement
among sovereign powers,' we have also considered as 'aids to its interpretation' the negotiation and
drafting history of the treaty as well as 'the postratification understanding' of signatory nations."
(quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996))). But see ALl TAX
TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 51-52 (arguing that testimony of an individual negotiator
should be given "little or no weight" because "his or her recollections or recordings of events may
not reflect a consensus of those participating, even on behalf of one country, much less the other,"
and also that a "battle of experts" pitting the recollections of negotiators against each other "seems a
time-consuming and unreliable way to arrive at a sound interpretation"). The ALI Tax Treaty
Project's concerns were prescient with respect to the Federal Circuit's Xerox decision, which was
decided a few years after the project's publication. See infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
106. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369 ("The practice of treaty signatories counts as evidence of the
treaty's proper interpretation, since their conduct generally evinces their understanding of the
agreement they signed." (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,
259 (1984))). This principle is consistent with the Vienna Convention, which provides that "[t]here
shall be taken into account, together with the context; ... [a]ny subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."
Vienna Convention, supra note 67, art. 31(3)(b).
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understanding by looking to treaty interpretations in existence at the time of
the negotiations of which the negotiators are aware. Most notably, in the
case of a tax treaty incorporating language from the OECD Model Treaty,
courts place significant emphasis on OECD Commentary that is in existence
at the time of a particular treaty's negotiation, on the assumption that the ne-
gotiators were aware of the existing Commentary and, by not providing
otherwise in the treaty, implicitly agreed to that interpretation. 1
07
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Alvarez-Machain,'0 8 has also
found indirect evidence of shared understanding by assuming that a treaty
partner was aware of relevant U.S. legal doctrines at the time of the treaty
negotiation. 0 9 Under this decision, which has been criticized as inconsistent
with international law principles,"0 if the treaty does not explicitly alter that
existing doctrine, the court can conclude that the parties have mutually
agreed that it remains in force. ''
Other types of extrinsic evidence that U.S. courts consider might be
viewed as going beyond the treatment of the treaty as a bilateral agreement
whose interpretive touchstone is the treaty partners' shared understanding." 2
For example, a court's use of Senate ratification history, such as the Senate
floor debates utilized by the Supreme Court in Stuart,113 does not necessarily
reflect the shared understanding of the treaty partners, given that the other
treaty country has no formal role in the Senate ratification process. As
107. See, e.g., N.W. Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Comm'r, 107 T.C. 363, 383-85 (1996)
(applying the OECD Commentary in interpreting a U.S.-Canada tax treaty); Taisei Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 535, 549-50 (1995) (applying the OECD Commentary in effect at the
time of negotiation, but only after resolving an interpretive question regarding an incorrect
conjunction in the Commentary itself).
108. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
109. This was a nontax case finding that the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty of 1978 did not
preclude "forcible abductions" in certain criminal proceedings. Id. at 666.
110. See, e.g., id. at 682 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's failure to condemn an
extra-treaty forcible abduction of a Mexican national, authorized by the Executive Branch, as a
"flagrant violation of international law").
11. See id. at 665-66 (concluding that, because the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty of 1978
does not explicitly contradict the existing Ker doctrine, which developed in the nineteenth century
and permitted certain forcible abductions, that doctrine remains in effect).
112. As one commentator observed:
Courts in the U.S. have been remarkably expansive in utilizing a wide variety
of sources in interpreting treaty provisions. They have cited the following
sources: Treasury Department technical explanations and Senate reports, even
though both are unilateral documents of the United States prepared after
execution of the treaty in connection with the advice and consent of the
Senate .... In interpreting a specific treaty, courts and the [IRS] have cited
corresponding provisions of other U.S. treaties, even though the other country
was not a party, and Treasury Regulations issued under other treaties. Courts
have also accepted as authoritative Treasury Regulations submitted to the other
Contracting State without response, on the ground that silence meant
acquiescence.
Smith, supra note 22, at 850-51 (internal citations omitted).
113. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 367 (1989) (citing 88 CONG. REC. 4714 (1942)).
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Professor Moore observed, the reference to Senate preratification materials is
not necessarily objectionable, provided the court does so for the purpose of
ascertaining the treaty partners' mutual understanding, rather than relying on
the unilateral understanding of the Senate. 1 4 Justice Scalia, in his concur-
rence in Stuart, took exception with the majority's reference to Senate floor
debates on these grounds, arguing that postsigning, preratification Senate
floor debates are not relevant "[t]o discover Canada's and the United States'
'intent and expectations.""'15
In response, Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Stuart argued that its
use of the Senate debate in interpreting the 1942 U.S.-Canada tax treaty is
consistent with contract-like principles regarding the parties' mutual
understanding. 1t 6 Justice Brennan noted that Senate debates are open to the
public and are not "out of earshot of proposed treaty partners."' 17 Based on
this, he implied that the other country reasonably should have known of the
Senate's interpretation and, by not objecting prior to ratification, implicitly
agreed with it.
118
This inference of mutual understanding based on the other countries'
nonresponse to a Senate floor debate is problematic. First, it assumes that the
appropriate representatives of the other country are aware of the Senate floor-
debate interpretation. While this would create an unmanageable burden in
the case of a multilateral treaty, where each country would be expected to
follow the ratification procedure in each of the other countries and object to
114. Professor Moore points out that the important question is not whether a court can look at
Senate materials, but what the court does with those materials:
It is no more remarkable for United States courts to refer to Senate materials
than it is for them to refer to law review articles or scholarly treatises. The
question is whether in either case they do so because they regard the issue for
decision as turning on the intent of the review or treatise writer or the intent of
the Senate, as opposed, in an interpretation case, to the intent of the parties.
The former would be truly remarkable in a treaty interpretation case and is not
born out by... cases. But Senate materials, as with law review articles or
treatises, may contain.., relevant information concerning the intent of the
parties. Citing or referring to such materials in Senate sources is simply to use
a convenient source for quite ordinary interpretative materials .... [H]owever,
this is not the same as looking at the Senate materials for the purpose of
ascertaining the Senate intent of one of the parties as the basis for decision, as
opposed to the shared intent of all the parties, as is well established under both
international law and the foreign relations law of the United States.
Moore, supra note 65, 177-78 (internal citation omitted).
115. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 373, 373-74 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Even... if one generally
regards the use of preratification extrinsic materials to confirm an unambiguous text as an
innocuous practice, there is special reason to object to that superfluous reference in the present
case."). For additional analysis of Justice Scalia's concurrence in Stuart, compare Detlev F. Vagts,
Senate Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme Court, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 546, 547-48 (1989), which criticizes Justice Scalia's underreliance on Supreme Court
precedent, with Moore, supra note 65, at 177, which criticizes Professor Vagts's approach.
116. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 367 n.7.
117. Id.
118. See id. (citing "hornbook contract law").
1086 [Vol. 87:1063
2009] The Limits of Administrative Guidance 1087
any statement with which it disagreed, even in the case of a bilateral tax
treaty it seems unrealistic. Indeed, the United States could not satisfy this
burden in the reverse situation, as the Treasury Department does not rou-
tinely monitor the tax-treaty-ratification debates in the other country. This
problem is exacerbated in situations where the treaty partner is a non-
English-speaking country. 119 Moreover, a finding of implicit agreement
places the other country's representatives in the difficult position of having to
navigate U.S. separation-of-powers issues, attempting to ascertain the rela-
tive weights of discussions with Treasury negotiators, contents of the
technical explanation, Senate committee documents, and statements of par-
ticular Senators on the floor of the Senate, and determining which of these, if
any, requires a formal response in order to avoid a later finding of implicit
assent. While the other country is made aware of formal objections and res-
ervations raised by the Senate and has the opportunity to officially respond
through an exchange of notes, the other country's silence with respect to less
formal aspects of Senate proceedings should not be viewed as evidence of
implicit mutual understanding.
U.S. courts also have been willing to look to the purpose of a tax treaty
as part of the interpretive process. 12  Frequently this reference to the treaty's
purpose is used merely to confirm the interpretation the court has derived
from the treaty language, 121 but in some circumstances courts have relied on
the treaty's purpose to apply a nonliteral interpretation of a tax treaty
provision.'
22
2. Relationship Between Treaties and Federal Statutes.-An additional
consideration in interpreting treaties concerns the relationship between fed-
eral statutes and treaties. Under some countries' legal systems, treaty
obligations have a higher status than internal laws and cannot be overridden
by subsequent internal legislation.123 However, under the U.S. Constitution,
119. Cf E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 541 (1991) (dismissing the official German
translation of French treaty text, thereby illustrating translation-related problems that can arise in
treaty interpretation).
120. See generally Smith, supra note 22, at 859-62 (arguing for purposive interpretations of
U.S. tax treaties).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368 (1989) (observing that the Court's
interpretation of the treaty language is consistent with "the evident purpose behind [the treaty]-the
reduction of tax evasion by allowing signatories to demand information from each other").
122. See, e.g., Estate of Burghardt v. Comm'r, 80 T.C. 705, 717 (1983) (interpreting the term
"specific exemption" in a U.S.-Italy estate tax treaty to include the estate tax unified credit in order
to effectuate the purpose of the treaty). But see Schoenblum, supra note 6, pt. V(B) (critiquing the
Burghardt case).
123. For a discussion of the differences among OECD member countries regarding the ability
to override treaties via internal legislation, see OECD, TREATY OVERRIDE (1989), reprinted in
COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, OECD, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL, at R(8)-
1 (2000) [hereinafter OECD TA TREATY OVERRIDE REPORT]. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 n.1 (1987) (evaluating the U.S. doctrine derived from the
Supremacy Clause that gives equal weight to treaties and federal statutes and requires the later in
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both federal law and treaties constitute the "supreme Law of the Land." 124
The Supreme Court has long interpreted this provision as giving treaties and
statutes equal status, so that a treaty "may supersede a prior act of Congress,
and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty."' 125  The Internal
Revenue Code reinforces this equal status in the case of tax statutes and tax
treaties, stating that "[f]or purposes of determining the relationship between a
provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting revenue, nei-
ther the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by reason of its being
a treaty or law."
126
Notwithstanding Congress's ability under U.S. constitutional principles
to override treaty obligations, courts generally attempt, if possible, to interp-
ret statutes in a manner that is consistent with existing treaty obligations.
121
However, when a clear conflict between the treaty and the federal law exists,
courts generally apply a last-in-time rule, 128 unless Congress has indicated
that it does not intend for subsequent legislation to override existing treaty
obligations. 1
29
time to prevail). But see Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 78-79 (critiquing the OECD Tax Treaty
Override Report as too extreme).
124. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ....").
125. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871) (citations omitted); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 114-115 (1987); ALI TAX TREATY
PROJECT, supra note 23, at 63-76 (both discussing the relationship between domestic law and
treaties); cf Anthony C. Infanti, The Proposed Domestic Reverse Hybrid Entity Regulations: Can
the Treasury Department Override Treaties?, 30 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 307, 307 n.3 (2001)
[hereinafter Infanti, Reverse Hybrid] (citing historical Treasury Department statements discouraging
the use of legislative overrides). But see Anthony C. Infanti, Curtailing Tax Treaty Overrides: A
Call to Action, 62 U. PiTT. L. REv. 677, 690-91 (2001) (arguing that Congress does not have
constitutional authority to override treaties by legislation, but acknowledging that such an argument
might not be successful due to stare decisis concerns).
126. I.R.C. § 7852(d) (2000); see also I.R.C. § 894(a)(1) (2000) ("The provisions of [the
Internal Revenue Code] shall be applied to any taxpayer with due regard to any treaty obligation of
the United States which applies to such taxpayer.").
127. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 114 (1987). This reluctance
to find a statutory override of a treaty obligation is consistent with the early Supreme Court
observation that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains." Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
118 (1804).
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1) (1987); ALL TAX TREATY
PROJECT, supra note 23, at 63.
129. For example, the Conference Report to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987
provides:
If this provision of the conference agreement [regarding the taxation of foreign
insurance companies] is found to be in conflict with any existing U.S. income
tax treaty, the conferees do not intend to apply the general principle that, in the
case of a conflict, a later enacted statute prevails over earlier enacted statutes
or treaties.
H.R. REP. NO. 100-495, at 983 (1987) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1245,
2313-1729. The Tax Court cited this legislative history in North West Life Assurance Co. of
Canada v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 363, 377 (1996). See generally Crow v. Comm'r, 85 T.C. 376,
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A legislative override of a U.S. treaty obligation constitutes a violation
of the United States' obligations under international law. 30 Accordingly, the
Treasury Department historically has opposed congressional exercise of this
power.' 3 ' Nonetheless, no practical remedies exist for a foreign taxpayer af-
fected by an override, and the potential remedies of the other treaty country
are quite limited. 132  Although the other treaty partner might be entitled to
terminate the treaty in response to an override that constitutes a material
breach, this is an "extreme and rarely taken step" in the context of a tax
treaty. 133  Indeed, Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah has argued that in limited
circumstances-particularly when taxpayers invoke the literal treaty text to
eliminate taxation in both countries-a narrow legislative override might be
defensible, particularly given the large amounts of money involved and the
time-consuming nature of tax treaty renegotiation. 134 A few U.S. tax treaty
383-84 (1985) (explaining that had the government made a treaty-override argument, it would have
been unpersuasive because of the explicit language in the statute saying that the statutory
amendments did not override existing treaties); ALL TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 72
("Expressions of Congressional intent in legislative history would undoubtedly be given significant
weight by a U.S. court in determining whether Congress intended the statute to override treaties.").
The report also notes:
There is language in some cases to the effect that a clear expression of
Congressional intent is required before a treaty will be considered abrogated
by ambiguous Congressional action. Nevertheless, even in the absence of an
express statement of Congressional intent to supersede a treaty, such an intent
may be inferred from the fact that the later statute flatly takes away a right
granted by the treaty.
Id. at 65 (citation omitted).
130. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, art. 27 ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 cmt. a (1987); ALI TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 73.
13 1. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 74 (noting that the Treasury Department, "which is in
charge of negotiating tax treaties, would usually prefer that there be no treaty overrides, given that
these make the task of negotiating future treaties harder"); Tom Gilroy, Bills to Disallow Foreign
Treaty Benefits Could Affect Treaty Process, Solomon Says, 40 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-2
(Feb. 29, 2008) (providing the comments of Eric Solomon, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
discussing Treasury's preference for negotiating changes to treaties, rather than utilizing
congressional overrides); see also Meg Shreve, Grassley Warns Against Violating Tax Treaties
With Farm Bill Tax Provision, 116 TAX NOTES 627 (2007), available at 116 Tax Notes 627 (Lexis)
(providing the comments of Senator Grassley, cautioning that "if lawmakers want to change tax
treaties, they should renegotiate them instead of 'unilaterally' undercutting those agreements").
132. ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 73-74 (noting that the aggrieved treaty
partner's options "include conveying a complaint through diplomatic channels, invoking the mutual
agreement procedure, or seeking to adjudicate the claim in the International Court of Justice," but
observing that "[e]ach of these approaches requires the cooperation of the offending country and
therefore is unlikely to succeed in many cases" (citations omitted)). The aggrieved treaty partner
might also seek to terminate the treaty if the U.S. legislative override is material. Id.; see also Avi-
Yonah, supra note 13, at 65-66 ("[B]oth taxpayers and the other treaty partner have little practical
recourse in the case of a treaty override beyond terminating the treaty, which is an extreme and
rarely taken step.").
133. Avi-Yonah, supra note 13, at 66.
134. See id. at 78-79 (comparing past tax treaty overrides that Professor Avi-Yonah argues
were justified with those that were not). Professor Avi-Yonah does "not believe the other treaty
partner has a justified expectation that the treaty will not be overridden in cases of abuse." Id. at 79.
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partners, concerned about the potential for a unilateral U.S. override, have
insisted on including explicit treaty language that commits the United States
to renegotiate the treaty in order to restore the balance of benefits in the case
of a unilateral override.
1 35
3. Role of Administrative Agency Interpretation.-A final relevant
concern regarding treaty interpretation involves separation-of-powers
issues.1 36 Statutes and treaties arise through different institutional channels in
the United States.1 37 Federal statutes are created in the Legislative Branch
with the involvement of both houses of Congress, with the Executive Branch
having a secondary role pursuant to the veto power (which may, in turn, be
overridden by the Legislative Branch). 138  In contrast, treaties initially are
drafted and negotiated by the Executive Branch, with one house of Congress
(the Senate) having a secondary role pursuant to its advice-and-consent
power. 139  This distinction is particularly interesting in the case of federal
taxes given that the Constitution envisions a significant role for the House of
Representatives regarding revenue laws, 40 yet the tax treaty process involves
only the Senate. 141
Indeed, in some circumstances (e.g., Canada's response to the I.R.C. § 894(c) "reverse hybrid"
legislation), the other treaty partner has not objected to U.S. tax treaty overrides that were intended
to prevent a perceived abuse of tax treaties. See id. at 77-78 (noting that Canada did not object to
the U.S. treaty override "that denied treaty benefits to such a 'reverse hybrid"').
135. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on
Income, U.S.-Switz., art. 28(5), Oct. 2, 1996, 2 U.S.T. 1751; Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Prevention of Fraud or Fiscal Evasion,
Protocol, U.S.-Italy, art. 7(1), Aug. 25, 1999 (not yet in force), available at http://www.irs.ustreas.
gov/pub/irs-utl/italyproposedweb.pdf.
136. Much recent scholarship and Supreme Court jurisprudence focuses on separation-of-
powers issues that arise among Congress, the President, and courts, particularly in the context of
prominent treaties with broad foreign-policy implications. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct.
1346, 1369-71 (2008) (discussing the distribution of treaty power between Congress and the
President). This Article does not purport to debate such issues on their merits. Rather, it highlights
those factors that are relevant in analyzing the legal authority to be given to ambulatory
administrative interpretations of tax treaties.
137. The institutional differences between statutes and treaties are implicitly reflected in the
structure of the Constitution, with the procedure for enacting statutes described in Article I
(regarding legislative powers) and the procedure for implementing treaties described in Article 11
(regarding executive power). Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, with id. art. II.
138. Id. art. I, § 7.
139. Id. art. II, § 2. This statement describes the practical relationship between the Executive
Branch and the Senate in the process of tax treaty negotiation. It does not purport to explore the
more theoretical relationship between the Executive Branch and the Senate in treaty making. For a
more detailed analysis of the relationship between the roles of the Executive Branch and the Senate
in treaty making, see Moore, supra note 65, at 192-93, and Mahoney, supra note 65, at 836-37.
140. The Constitution provides that "[a]ll Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House
of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Although this provision has little, if any, practical
effect given the Senate's ability to amend in full a revenue bill originating in the House, it
nonetheless demonstrates the important role envisioned for the House in tax legislation.
141. As a practical matter, tax treaties generally do not "raise" revenue because their principal
function is to surrender U.S. taxing rights over foreign persons in certain circumstances (in
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Courts often purport to give significant weight to Executive Branch
interpretations of U.S. treaties. 142  As the Supreme Court has observed,
"Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the
Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is en-
titled to great weight.', 143 In the case of tax treaties, this results in courts
looking to guidance issued by the Treasury Department (and the Internal
Revenue Service, which is a bureau within the Treasury Department). Not
only does the Treasury Department have the particular expertise in the sub-
ject matter (as well as the responsibility for enforcement of the area via the
IRS), but it also is the Executive department that negotiates the tax treaties.
44
Of course, as the Stuart opinion notes, the administrative agency's
interpretation is not conclusive. 145 Indeed, in many tax cases, courts have
interpreted treaties in a manner contrary to administrative guidance. For
example, the Tax Court in Crow v. Commissioner14 6 rejected an IRS revenue-
ruling interpretation of a treaty that had been issued in anticipation of
litigation, noting that the revenue ruling did not "constitute a consistent and
long-standing administrative position with prior congressional or judicial ap-
proval [so] it is not entitled to any special deference in this Court.' 4 7  In
Snap-On Tools v. United States,148 the U.S. Claims Court refused to rely on
the technical explanation to the U.S.-U.K. income tax treaty. 49 In the recent
National Westminster Bank 5° (NatWest) decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit rejected the application of a Treasury Department regula-
tion concerning interest-expense apportionment, finding that the regulation
was inconsistent with the plain language of the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty and
other evidence purporting to demonstrate the parties' mutual
understanding.' 51 The balance of this Article focuses on the various forms of
administrative guidance and provides more detailed guidance as to how
much deference, if any, courts should give to these various types of
exchange for the other country surrendering its taxing rights over U.S. persons). See ALl TAX
TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 2 (discussing the reciprocal nature of tax treaties).
142. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 326(2) (1987)
("Courts... will give great weight to [a treaty] interpretation made by the Executive Branch.").
143. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)).
144. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
145. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369.
146. 85 T.C. 376 (1985).
147. Id. at 389; see also ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 58 (arguing that a
revenue ruling adopted in anticipation of pending litigation "should not be entitled to any special
deference as an agency interpretation of a treaty").
148. 26 Cl. Ct. 1045 (1992), aff'd, 26 F.3d 137 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
149. Id. at 1060-61; see also infra notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
150. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest), 512 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
151. Id. at 1354-55. For a detailed discussion of the NatWest litigation, including the district
and appeals courts' treaty analysis, see Reinhold & Harrington, supra note 22, at 173-82. See also
id. at 193 (suggesting that the treaty did not necessarily contain "plain language").
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administrative guidance, particularly in the case of guidance issued after a
particular treaty enters into force.
4. Unique Aspects of Tax Treaties.-Before applying these treaty-
interpretation principles to ambulatory Treasury Department guidance, it is
important to note several unique aspects of tax treaties. These aspects in-
volve both practical concerns surrounding tax treaties and particular
provisions that appear in most tax treaties.
a. Complex and Technical Nature of the Area.-Tax treaties do not
exist in a vacuum. Each of the treaty partners has its own complex,
technical, and ever-changing internal tax-law regime. Indeed, the principal
purpose for tax treaties is to bridge and at least partly reconcile these internal
regimes. 152 Given these complexities, it is not surprising that tax treaties can-
not specifically address every tax issue that exists between the two countries,
let alone anticipate the specific impact of subsequent changes in each
country's tax laws or future developments in global business structures and
transactions.
Moreover, even with respect to those issues that the treaty does address,
in order to avoid unmanageable complexity, the treaty can set forth only gen-
eral rules and principles that the countries agree to. As commentators have
recently noted, tax treaties often have "generalized 'treaty speak' that has
relatively little connotative value standing alone."'
153
b. Treaty Provisions Incorporating Future Developments.-By
their express terms, U.S. tax treaties envision a role for some future devel-
opments in several contexts. First, the mutual-agreement-procedure article in
tax treaties generally grants the competent authorities of the two treaty coun-
tries broad latitude to resolve jointly "any difficulties or doubts arising as to
the interpretation or application of the Convention."' 154 Moreover, adopting a
purposive approach, the treaty allows the competent authorities to reach
agreements to eliminate double taxation even in cases not provided for in the
treaty. 155 Among other things, this allows them to reach agreements regard-
ing the application of the treaty to circumstances that arise when one of the
country's tax laws change in the future. 5 6 Given that this provision has
152. See OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, intro.
153. Reinhold & Harrington, supra note 22, at 203 (citing examples); see also Smith, supra
note 22, at 879 ("Tax treaties are efforts to coordinate two different tax systems in a general way
only, and do not achieve the degree of particularity and precision of either internal tax system.").
154. 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 25(3); OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4,
art. 25(3).
155. Both the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty and the OECD Model Treaty provide that the competent
authorities may "consult together for the elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for in
the Convention." 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 25(3); OECD MODEL TREATY,
supra note 4, art. 25(3).
156. See OECD MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, commentary on art. 25, para. 34.
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relevance only when the two countries' competent authorities mutually
agree, it is not directly relevant to the unilateral administrative interpretations
that are the focus of this Article.
Second, and more important for purposes of this Article, tax treaties
explicitly contemplate that unilateral legal developments in one country may
affect the interpretation of a treaty subsequent to its entry into force. Article
3(2) of both the OECD Model Treaty and the U.S. Model Treaty (as well as
actual treaties based thereon) provides:
As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a
Contracting State, any term not defined shall, unless the context
otherwise requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the
law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention
applies, any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State
prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that
State. 157
The italicized language in the preceding quotation makes clear that the
relevant internal law of a contracting state is "the law in effect at the time the
treaty is being applied, not the law as in effect at the time the treaty was
signed."' 158 As noted by an OECD report, "It cannot have been contemplated
that, having once entered into a treaty, a State would be unable to change de-
finitions of terms used in its domestic law provided such changes were
compatible with the context of the treaty.' 159  According to the OECD
Commentary, this ambulatory aspect of tax treaties addresses "the need to be
able to apply the Convention in a convenient and practical way over time.'
60
Several other treaty provisions implicitly incorporate relevant internal
law of one of the countries in specific circumstances. For example, under
157. OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 3(2) (emphasis added). The text here quotes the
OECD Model Treaty version of Article 3(2). The U.S. Model Treaty provision is identical, except
for minor punctuation differences and the explicit exception for circumstances when "the competent
authorities agree to a common meaning pursuant to the provisions of Article 25." 2006 U.S.
MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 3(2). The OECD addresses the relationship between Article 3(2)
and Article 25 in a similar way, but it does so in the Commentary rather than in the treaty language.
See OECD MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, commentary on art. 3, para. 13.1 ("States that are
able to enter into mutual agreements.. . that establish the meanings of terms not defined in the
Convention should take those agreements into account in interpreting those terms.").
The Supreme Court, interpreting the 1945 U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, applied an earlier version of
modem Article 3(2). Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 53 (1963). Because the term
"person" was not defined in the treaty, the Court looked to internal U.S. tax law. Id. Finding that a
trust was a "person" under U.S. tax law, the Court held that a U.S. trust was a resident of the United
States for purposes of the treaty and could not claim treaty benefits against the United States. Id.;
see also Townsend, supra note 22, at 264 (discussing Maximov).
158. 2006 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 16, art. 3, para. 2; see also
OECD MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, commentary on art. 3, para. 11 (noting that the OECD
Model was amended in 1995 to provide explicitly that the relevant focus is the domestic law in
force at the time the treaty is being applied, rather than the domestic law in force at the time the
treaty was signed).
159. OECD TAX TREATY OVERRIDE REPORT, supra note 123, at R(8)-4.
160. OECD MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, commentary on art. 3, para. 13.
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Article 23 of most tax treaties, the United States generally agrees to allow a
foreign tax credit to a U.S. citizen or resident "[i]n accordance with the pro-
visions and subject to the limitations of the law of the United States (as it
may be amended from time to time without changing the general principle
hereoj)."'161 References to the applicability of internal law also appear in
some treaty provisions addressing the taxation of a country's former citizens
and long-term residents,' 62 the determination of whether income involving
certain fiscally transparent entities is treated as derived by a resident of a
contracting state, 163 the scope of information exchange allowed between the
countries' tax administrators, 164 and several other specifically defined
terms. 165
The ability to effect ambulatory changes in treaty interpretation via
internal-law changes is not without limits, even when the treaty explicitly
refers to internal law. For example, Article 3(2) defers to the (potentially
ambulatory) meaning of a term under internal law only if the "context" does
not otherwise require. 166  Similarly, Article 23 allows the United States to
apply its internal-law limitations on the foreign tax credit only to the extent
those limitations do not "chang[e] the general principle[s] hereof.''l 67 These
limitations are discussed in more detail in subpart V(A).
161. 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 23(2) (emphasis added); see also 2006 U.S.
MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 16, art. 23, para. 2 ("[A]lthough the Convention
provides for a foreign tax credit, the terms of the credit are determined by the provisions, at the time
a credit is given, of the U.S. statutory credit." (emphasis added)).
162. See 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 1(4) ("[A] former citizen or former long-
term resident of a Contracting State may, for the period of ten years following the loss of such
status, be taxed in accordance with the laws of that Contracting State.").
163. See id. art. 1(6). This article provides:
An item of income... derived through an entity that is fiscally transparent under the
laws of either Contracting State shall be considered to be derived by a resident of a
State to the extent that the item is treated for purposes of the taxation law of such
Contracting State as the income, profit or gain of a resident.
Id.
164. See id. art. 26 (allowing the exchange of "such information as may be relevant for carrying
out the provisions of this Convention or of the domestic laws of the Contracting States"). The
Supreme Court, in Stuart, addressed the interpretation of an analogous provision in the 1942 U.S.-
Canada Income Tax Treaty. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365 (1989).
165. See, e.g., 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 3(l)(b) (defining "company"); id.
art. 3(1)0) (defining "national"); id. arts. 4(1), (2), and (4) (all defining "resident"); id. art. 6(2)
(defining "real property"); id. art. 10(5) (defining "dividends"); id. art. 11(3) (defining "interest");
id. art. 17(4) (defining "alimony"); cf id. art. 3(1)(i) (incorporating references to international law to
define the term "United States"); id. art. 27 (incorporating references to international law to define
the limits on taxing diplomats).
166. Id. art. 3(2).
167. Id. art. 23(2).
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IV. The Limits of Ambulatory Treasury Technical Explanations
A. Legal Status of Technical Explanations
The preceding Part analyzed relevant treaty-interpretation principles,
particularly those under U.S. law. This Part applies those principles to de-
termine the weight, if any, that should be accorded to technical explanations.
It first addresses technical explanations promulgated simultaneously with, or
prior to, the treaty in question. It then focuses on technical explanations
published after the treaty in question has entered into force, including later
revisions to the U.S. model technical explanations or technical explanations
published in the context of subsequent treaties with other countries.
68
However, before focusing on this ever-changing body of technical
explanations, it is important first to address the general legal status of tech-
nical explanations under U.S. administrative-law principles.
In United States v. Mead Corp.,169 the Supreme Court held that an
administrative interpretation
qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority... [through] notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by
some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.
170
Neither the model technical explanations nor an actual technical explanation
prepared in anticipation of the Senate advice-and-consent process is pub-
lished pursuant to such legislative authority. 171  Accordingly, technical
explanations do not carry the force of law.
168. As noted above, this question was asked, but not answered, in the New York State Bar
Association's comments on the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
169. 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
170. Id. at 226.
171. Some provisions in the Code delegate to the Treasury the authority to make regulations
carrying the force of law. See infra notes 272-80 and accompanying text. However, the Treasury
does not claim to be exercising such authority when it publishes technical explanations. Moreover,
technical explanations are not promulgated through a formal, public-comment procedure. See
David L. Raish et al., Issues Paper on the Tax Treaty Making Process, 46 TAX LAW. 477, 477
(1993) ("Unlike tax legislation and regulations, issues relating to U.S. treaties, the proposed text of
treaties and the technical explanations, and committee reports are published too late to enable the
public to participate in and influence the treaty making process."). A representative of an
international bankers' trade group recently criticized the technical explanations to the recent Belgian
treaty and German protocol on these grounds, alleging that they purport to change the interpretation
of the consistency rule found in many U.S. treaties "through the release by the Treasury Department
of technical explanations to treaties [with Belgium and Germany] rather than through a proper
Congressional or regulatory process that allows for a full airing of the relevant policy and technical
considerations." Letter from Lawrence Uhlick to Eric Solomon, supra note 55. As a practical
matter, interested parties may provide informal comments regarding provisions they would like to
see in a forthcoming technical explanation.
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In this regard, technical explanations are similar to revenue rulings,
172
which are published "without the sort of public participation that is mandated
as to regulations. While there is some disagreement in judicial
opinions174 and academic literature175 regarding the precise level of deference
accorded to revenue rulings-ranging from limited Skidmore deference to no
deference-there is widespread agreement that they "are entitled to consider-
ably less deference than an agency's properly promulgated regulations."'
176
As a recent Fifth Circuit opinion observed, "Unlike treasury regulations, the
IRS does not invoke its authority to make rules with the force of law when
promulgating revenue rulings."'' 77 Similarly, the Treasury Department does
not invoke its authority to make rules with the force of law when
172. According to the Tax Court, "[N]either the Technical Explanation nor [a revenue ruling] is
to be considered 'the law of the United States' for the purposes of [Article 23] of the U.S.-U.K.
Convention." Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 363, 372 (1999).
John Townsend has suggested that a treaty's technical explanation "is entitled to deference
because it is a regulation substitute and has important features that justify administrative deference."
Townsend, supra note 22, at 261. However, Townsend acknowledges that a technical explanation
lacks the comment period of regulations. Id. While interested taxpayers might submit informal
comments to the Treasury Department after a treaty is signed and before the technical explanation is
published, the Treasury Department does not provide a formal, public opportunity to make
comments and does not consider public comments (or make modifications) to a treaty's technical
explanation after it has been published. Id. In this regard, a technical explanation seems more
analogous to a revenue ruling than a regulation (although, as noted in the text, the technical
explanation may gain additional relevance by reason of the Senate relying on it-i.e., by reason of
treaty-interpretation principles, rather than administrative law).
173. Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards,
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1042 (1995).
174. See, e.g., Kornman & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 452, 452-53 (5th Cir.
2008) ("Revenue Rulings do not have the presumptive force and effect of law but are merely
persuasive as the Commissioner's official interpretation of statutory provisions."); Black & Decker
Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he precise degree of deference owed
to these rulings-particularly in the face of the IRS's decision to interpret the statute differently in
litigation-is unclear."); Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comn'r, 347 F.3d 173, 181 (6th Cir. 2003)
(stating that "some" Skidmore deference is appropriate and citing other cases).
175. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblin of Little Minds No More: Justice Requires an IRS
Duty of Consistency, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 317, 336 (2006) (noting that, with the exception of the
Tax Court, "most courts treat revenue rulings with some form of deference," and discussing the
Sixth Circuit's deferential treatment of revenue rulings); cf Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax
Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST.
L.J. 637, 644-45 (1996) (describing courts' self-described justifications for deferring to or ignoring
revenue rulings as "mere window-dressing that does not have any effect on the ultimate resolution
of the case"). See generally Galler, supra note 173 (offering an overview of the meaning of revenue
rulings, the debate over deference, and the different standards ofjudicial review for revenue rulings
in the Tax Court, the courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court). A recent report by an ABA Tax
Section task force concludes that revenue rulings are not entitled to Chevron deference like
regulations but should receive some limited Skidmore deference, "which directs courts to take into
account the agency's experience and its power to persuade, but to retain the ability to choose a
better rule even if the agency interpretation is reasonable." Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of
Taxation, Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 719 (2004).
176. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2000).
177. Kornman, 527 F.3d at 454 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (2008)).
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promulgating technical explanations. 78 Moreover, technical explanations, as
administrative guidance, might be entitled to even less deference than the
limited deference that some courts give revenue rulings. Whereas revenue
rulings generally interpret the tax law created wholly within the U.S. legal
system, technical explanations purport to interpret treaty provisions created
with the additional involvement of another country, thereby adding an addi-
tional stakeholder who generally is not represented in the interpretation.
Because a technical explanation-either with respect to a particular
treaty or with respect to the U.S. model-does not have the force of law, its
only relevance, if any, arises in the context of the treaty interpretation prin-
ciples discussed in the prior Part. In order to determine the limits of
technical explanations under these principles, the following analysis begins
with the strongest case for deferring to technical explanations under these
principles and gradually moves to more tenuous cases.
B. Contemporaneous and Preexisting Technical Explanations
1. Joint Technical Explanation of a Specific Treaty.-In rare
circumstances, the Treasury Department coordinates with the other treaty
country when preparing the treaty's technical explanation, and the other
treaty country agrees to the explanation's contents. For example, Canadian
tax authorities recently agreed to the technical explanation prepared by the
Treasury Department, in consultation with Canada, with respect to the 2007
Protocol to the U.S.-Canada tax treaty.
179
This joint technical explanation appears to have significant weight
under the Vienna Convention, which defines the relevant context of the
treaty to include "[a]ny instrument which was made by one or more parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties
178. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
179. See Testimony of Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs
Michael F. Mundaca Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations on Pending Income Tax Treaties,
110th Cong. D866 (2008), text available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2008/Mundaca
Testimony0807 1Op.pdf ("The Technical Explanation to the Protocol with Canada was reviewed by
Canada, and Canada subscribes to its contents, as will be confirmed by a press release from the
Canadian Ministry of Finance."). The U.S.-Canada technical explanation itself refers to its joint
nature:
The Technical Explanation is an official United States guide to the Protocol.
The government of Canada has reviewed this document and subscribes to its
contents. In the view of both governments, this document accurately reflects
the policies behind particular Protocol provisions, as well as understandings
reached with respect to the application and interpretation of the Protocol and
the Convention.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PROTOCOL AMENDING THE
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CANADA WITH RESPECT TO TAXES
ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 1 (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/
tecanada08.pdf. The Treasury Department considered a significant amount of public comment
submitted with respect to the preparation of the joint Canada technical explanation.
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as an instrument related to the treaty."' 80  Although the joint technical
explanation was not prepared until after the treaty had been signed,18'S its
preparation was contemplated by the treaty negotiators, and it was completed
in time to be considered by the Senate as part of its hearings.' 82 Accordingly,
the joint technical explanation appears to have been made "in connection
with the conclusion of the treaty" under Vienna Convention Article 31 (2)(b).
Even if it is not viewed as having been made in connection with the treaty's
conclusion, it would be taken into account under Article 31(3)(a), which
considers "[a]ny subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.' 83
More importantly, for purposes of this Article, a joint technical
explanation is likely to be given significant weight by U.S. courts under U.S.
legal principles. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has been willing to
look to extrinsic evidence when the treaty text is ambiguous. 184 To the extent
that a joint technical explanation fills gaps not specifically addressed by the
treaty text, 185 it provides strong evidence of the two countries' mutual under-
standing and thus should have significant weight. Even to the extent that the
joint technical explanation provides a result inconsistent with a literal reading
of the words of the treaty, a court might give significant weight to the joint
technical explanation. As the Supreme Court observed in Stuart, "The clear
import of treaty language controls unless 'application of the words of the
treaty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with
the intent or expectations of its signatories."",186 Given that a joint technical
explanation is created and agreed to as part of the treaty-creation process
(after the negotiation, but before the entry into force), it seems to provide
strong evidence of the signatories' "intent or expectations," particularly in
specific examples addressed by the technical explanation. As the Tax Court
noted with respect to a joint technical explanation to an earlier U.S.-Canada
180. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, art. 31 (2)(b).
181. More typically, instruments jointly made "in connection with the conclusion of the treaty"
are prepared and signed simultaneously with the treaty. See IFA STUDY, supra note 21, at 71 ("[It
is] not uncommon practice for parties to a tax treaty to annex a protocol or an exchange of notes to
the text of the treaty and ... these interpretive declarations are therefore expressly accepted by the
other party and have legal effect."). Examples of these instruments include memoranda of
understanding and exchanges of notes. See, e.g., Exchange of Notes Accompanying Protocol
Amending the Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., Sept. 21,
2007, available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/CanadaDipNotes07.pdf.
182. See Testimony of Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs
Michael F. Mundaca Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations on Pending Income Tax Treaties,
supra note 172, at 6 (noting that the technical explanation was envisioned to serve as an official
guide to the treaty).
183. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, art. 31 (3)(a).
184. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
185. Of course, if the joint technical explanation merely confirms the clear meaning of the
treaty text, the technical explanation is superfluous and plays little role in the interpretation.
186. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.
v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)).
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income tax protocol, "[T]he Treasury's interpretation, set forth in the
Technical Explanation, is particularly persuasive in light of the fact that the
Canadian Department of Finance has generally accepted the Technical
Explanation as an accurate portrayal of the understandings and context in
which the Canadian Convention was negotiated."
187
2. Unilateral Technical Explanation of a Specific Treaty.-The joint
U.S.-Canada technical explanation is an anomaly. In the vast majority of
treaties, the Treasury Department prepares the technical explanation after the
treaty has been signed and with no direct involvement of the other treaty
country. 188 While the Treasury Department might send a copy of the com-
pleted technical explanation to the other treaty country (simultaneously with
the technical explanation's submission to the Senate), the other country's as-
sent is neither solicited nor received. Indeed, a few technical explanations
explicitly state that a copy of the technical explanation has been provided to
the other country but are silent regarding the other country's response or
views regarding the explanation.189
A significant question exists regarding the weight, if any, that a court
would give to these self-serving statements, particularly in the absence of
other evidence indicating a mutual understanding. The Federal Circuit opin-
ion in Xerox Corp. v. United States19 ° demonstrates the skepticism of some
187. N.W. Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Comm'r, 107 T.C. 363, 385 (1996) (concluding,
however, that the IRS in litigation misconstrued the meaning of that joint technical explanation).
However, a Canadian court, interpreting the 1980 U.S.-Canada tax treaty, refused to defer to
language in the U.S. technical explanation regarding the taxation of capital gains. Canada v.
Kubicek Estate, [1997] 220 N.R. 316, 319 (Can.). Although the court acknowledged that the
Canadian Minister of Finance had endorsed the U.S.-prepared technical explanation, it concluded
that a literal reading of the technical explanation was inconsistent with the otherwise apparent
intention of the parties. Id.; see also Haas Estate v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, No. A-709-99, 2000
N.R. LEXIS 516 (F.C.A. Nov. 3, 2000) (Can.) (following Kubicek Estate); Ian J. Gamble, Canada's
Failure to Apply the U.S. Technical Explanation to a New Treaty Article, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY,
Feb. 19, 2009, 2009 WTD 31-6 (Lexis) (criticizing a recently published position by the Canada
Revenue Agency that failed to apply an interpretation in the joint technical explanation to the recent
U.S.-Canada tax treaty protocol).
188. See ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 36 ("In all but exceptional cases,
Technical Explanations are not agreed to by the treaty partner and, therefore, are unilateral
documents.").
189. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
IRELAND FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION
WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME AND CAPITAL GAINS SIGNED AT DUBLIN ON JULY 28, 1997
AND THE PROTOCOL SIGNED AT DUBLIN ON JULY 28, 1997, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 4435, intro.
(July 28, 1997), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/iretech.pdf ("This Technical
Explanation has been provided to Ireland."); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SWISS
CONFEDERATION FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON
INCOME SIGNED AT WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 2, 1996 AND THE PROTOCOL SIGNED AT
WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 2, 1996, 4 Tax Treaties (CCH) 9145, intro. (Oct. 2, 1996) ("This
technical explanation has been provided to Switzerland.").
190. 41 F.3d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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courts (and deference of others) regarding the extent to which the other
country has acquiesced in a technical explanation's interpretation (or is even
aware of it). In that case, the IRS argued that the technical explanation to the
1975 U.S.-U.K. treaty supported its position that the treaty did not require
the United States to allow a foreign tax credit for the U.K. advance corporate
tax. 191 The U.S. Claims Court placed significant reliance on the technical
explanation, finding that "the record indicates at least tacit acceptance by the
U.K. of the U.S. interpretation ... set forth in the Technical Explanation....
Knowledge of the U.S. interpretation, therefore, was clearly before the House
of Commons during its own ratification debate."' 92 The Claims Court's
conclusion was based solely on an after-the-fact affidavit of one of the U.S.
negotiators, who asserted that "copies of the Technical Explanation would
have been sent to the U.K. negotiators.' 93
On appeal, the Federal Circuit was much more skeptical of the
purported assent by the United Kingdom. Although the U.S. negotiator
asserted that a copy of the technical explanation "would have been sent to the
U.K. negotiators," the Federal Circuit noted that "[n]o evidence of such
'sending' was provided, and it must be assumed that the Treasury's files
contained no such support."'194 Moreover, "[b]oth of the United Kingdom's
Ministers for the Treasury averred that they did not accept, or even know of,
the position taken in the Technical Explanation."' 95 Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit concluded-in stark contrast to the lower court-that "[o]n this
extremely one-sided record, it would violate any reasonable canon of
construction to infer mutual assent by the signatories to the position taken by
the Treasury."'
' 96
For similar reasons, a court might be reluctant to place much, if any,
weight on the explicit, unilateral assertion in several recent technical expla-
nations that they reflect "understandings reached during the negotiations
with respect to the application and interpretation of the Convention,"'
' 97
191. Id. at 653. See generally Townsend, supra note 22, at 301-03 (discussing the use of the
technical explanation in Xerox).
192. Xerox Corp. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 455, 463-64 (1988), rev'd, 41 F.3d 647 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
193. Id.
194. Xerox, 41 F.3d at 656.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
ICELAND FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION
WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME, 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) 4041, intro. (July 10, 2008),
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/teiceland08.pdf (emphasis added); U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
TAXATION AND THE PREVENTION OF FISCAL EVASION WITH RESPECT TO TAXES ON INCOME,
SIGNED AT WASHtNGTON ON FEBRUARY 23, 2007, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1841, intro. (July 10,
2008) (emphasis added).
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particularly in the absence of other evidence that the interpretations actually
reflect mutual understandings. This concern is particularly significant be-
cause that phrase contained in recent technical explanations to actual treaties
is similar to the language in the 2006 Model Technical Explanation.'9"
Accordingly, a court might view the assertion as mere boilerplate language
copied from the Model, rather than a factually correct assertion regarding the
negotiations of that particular treaty. 
199
It is important to note that, as a practical matter, those lower court cases
that look to a technical explanation generally have done so merely to confirm
the interpretation that the court claims to have reached through some other
interpretive approach, most typically the court's view of the plain meaning of
the treaty language.2 °0 Indeed, the Supreme Court's reference to the Senate
debate in Stuart fits this same pattern-it merely used the Senate debate to
confirm the interpretation the Court had already reached by other interpretive
means. 20  To the extent that a technical explanation is referenced merely to
198. See 2006 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 16, intro. ("[The Technical
Explanation] reflects the policies behind particular Convention provisions, as well as
understandings reached with respect to the application and interpretation of the Convention.").
199. A recent Tax Court decision might be interpreted as accepting this Technical Explanation
assertion on its face with no inquiry into its factual veracity. See Estate of Silver v. Comm'r, 120
T.C. 430, 435 n.8 (2003) (referencing this language in support of the court's reliance on the
technical explanation to the 1995 U.S.-Canada Income Tax Treaty Protocol). As a factual matter,
the statement in the protocol at issue in Silver was accurate-the Canadian tax authorities had
expressly signed off on the technical explanation at the time it was issued. See Press Release, Can.
Dep't of Fin., Protocol to the Canada-United States Income Tax Convention: U.S. Technical
Explanation (June 13, 1995), available at http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/2007
1122100207/http://www.fin.gc.ca/news95/95-048e.html. The Tax Court, however, merely relied on
the boilerplate statement in the technical explanation itself, apparently without verifying its
accuracy or explicitly noting the technical explanation's joint nature. Silver, 120 T.C. at 435.
200. See, e.g., Haver v. Comm'r, 444 F.3d 656, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Pekar v. Comm'r, 113
T.C. 158, 163-64 (1999) (both concluding that the plain language of the U.S.-Germany treaty
subjected the taxpayer's foreign tax credit to the limitations of U.S. law, thereby permitting the IRS
to apply the alternative-minimum-tax limitations, and citing to the technical explanation as
confirmation); Clayton v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 628, 655 (1995) (noting that the technical
explanation, like the plain language of the U.S.-Canada income tax treaty, failed to support the
taxpayer's argument regarding the residence of the trust).
A recent Tax Court case placed significant emphasis on the U.S.-Canada technical
explanation (and a similar interpretation in the Senate report) without first addressing the plain
meaning of the treaty text. See Silver, 120 T.C. at 434-35 (upholding the denial of a deduction for
the decedent's charitable bequest to the extent that the property was not included in the decedent's
U.S. gross estate). The Tax Court did not squarely address the legal rationale for deferring to the
technical explanation, other than briefly quoting from the technical explanation itself, which states
that the explanation is the "official guide to the Protocol. It explains policies behind particular
provisions, as well as understandings reached during the negotiations with respect to the
interpretation and application of the Protocol." Id. at 435 n.8. Although not explicitly
acknowledged in Silver, the U.S.-Canada technical explanation at issue in that case was a joint
technical explanation that Canada had agreed to, and it would be entitled to greater weight than a
unilateral technical explanation. See supra note 199.
201. This use of materials from the Senate consent process merely to confirm the plain meaning
of the treaty text was criticized by Justice Kennedy in his Stuart concurrence. United States v.
Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 370 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's majority opinion
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confirm an interpretation already reached in some other manner, the use of
the technical explanation is of little consequence.2 °2
A final factor concerning the deference given to a treaty's technical
explanation relates to the Senate advice-and-consent process. The Treasury
Department prepares the technical explanation for a treaty prior to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the treaty, so both the Committee
and the full Senate have access to this document prior to giving consent to
the treaty.2 °3 Indeed, for the benefit of the Foreign Relations Committee, the
Joint Committee on Taxation prepares an explanation to the treaty in which it
analyzes the interpretations set forth in the technical explanation. °4
The Supreme Court in Stuart indicated a willingness to look to the
Senate floor debate in interpreting a tax treaty. As discussed above, the
Court's attempt to justify this reference was based on a relatively weak sug-
gestion that the other country is assumed to have knowledge of the debate
and, by not objecting, implicitly agreed that the Senate's interpretation re-
flects a mutual understanding. 20 5 The case for extending the Stuart Court's
rationale is somewhat stronger in the case of the technical explanation to the
treaty being interpreted, at least in circumstances where there is evidence that
the Treasury Department actually sent a copy of the technical explanation to
the treaty partner in a timely manner (as opposed to the circumstances in
Stuart, where the Court implied a potentially unrealistic obligation on the
treaty partner to take the initiative to make itself aware of all public Senate
hearings and other public materials regarding the treaty).20 6
Of course, the treaty partner's silence after receiving the technical
explanation does not constitute direct evidence of agreement to the
interpretations therein. Accordingly, the technical explanation should be
given little weight when there is other, more reliable evidence of the parties'
mutual understanding of a treaty's terms, such as OECD Commentary in ex-
istence at the time of the treaty negotiations. However, in the absence of
such evidence, the technical explanation to the treaty in question is at least as
cited the Senate debate over the treaty, concluding that it supported the interpretation that the
opinion had already reached regarding the meaning of the treaty language. Id. at 367 (majority
opinion). Justice Kennedy argued that there was no need to consult the Senate debate or to
determine the extent to which such consultation is permissible because the Justices unanimously
agreed that the treaty text itself resolved the issue. Id. at 370 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
202. As the International Fiscal Association observed in an analogous interpretation of
ambulatory OECD Commentaries under Vienna Convention principles, "Of course, if the
interpretation [of the treaty text] is clear and unambiguous, the words in the particular tax treaty do
not require reference to the commentaries to be interpreted." IFA STUDY, supra note 21, at 80; see
also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
204. E.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED
INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BULGARIA (Comm. Print 2008)
[hereinafter EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TREATY].
205. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the Federal Circuit's skepticism in Xerox as to whether the Treasury
Department actually sent the technical explanation, see supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
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relevant as other evidence that a court might consider. For example, courts
have sometimes relied on affidavits of negotiators that are executed years
later, in the context of litigation, and often after the negotiator has left gov-
ernment service.2 °7 In contrast, the technical explanation to a particular
treaty is published during the course of the ratification process, and perhaps
most importantly, interested members of the public have access to it during
that period. Indeed, as a practical matter, representatives of various indus-
tries and interest groups give detailed attention to the technical explanation
and publicly highlight and express concern regarding potentially troublesome
or unusual interpretations prior to the time that instruments of ratification are
exchanged.208 Accordingly, while the unilateral technical explanation to the
specific treaty certainly is not controlling,209 it can be viewed as providing at
least some evidence of mutual understanding in the absence of more reliable
evidence.
In rare circumstances, a factual question might arise regarding the
Senate's understanding of a technical explanation. For example, in Xerox,
the Federal Circuit observed that the Senate Executive Report "mentioned
the 'difficult and complex issues' raised [by the Technical Explanation], and
declined to 'adopt or reject' the 'amplifications' in the Technical
Explanation., 210 In such circumstances, where there is an indication that the
Senate itself questioned the interpretation provided in the technical
explanation, the case for using that aspect of the technical explanation is
significantly weakened.211
3. Previously Published Model Technical Explanation.-As discussed
above,212 the Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain was willing to find indirect
evidence of shared understanding in a nontax setting by assuming that the
treaty partner was aware of relevant U.S. legal doctrines at the time of the
treaty negotiation. At least one commentator has suggested that Alvarez-
Machain supports a conclusion that the treaty partner might be viewed as
207. See supra note 105.
208. See, e.g., Letter from Lawrence Uhlick to Eric Solomon, supra note 55.
209. See EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED TREATY, supra note 204, at 85 n.57 ("Although the
Technical Explanation does indicate the Department of the Treasury's interpretation of the treaty,
that interpretation is not legally binding on Bulgaria."); see also Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v.
United States (NatWest), 58 Fed. Cl. 491, 499 (2003) (observing that "even if the court were to read
these statements more broadly, the unilateral views of the U.S. are not controlling," after concluding
that the technical explanation did not support the IRS's litigating position), affid, 512 F.3d 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2008). While the NatWest court stated that the technical explanation was "not
controlling," that does not necessarily mean that technical explanations should have no weight.
210. Xerox Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d 647, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
211. The court stated that while "[o]ne may debate the meaning of this cool treatment of the
Technical Explanation [in the Senate Report]," what is clear "is that the Treasury's position was not
embraced by the Senate." Id. at 655-66; see also NatWest, 58 Fed. Cl. at 499 (concluding that the
IRS misinterpreted both a statement in the technical explanation and the Senate's understanding of
the technical explanation).
212. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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implicitly assenting to the interpretation contained in the U.S. model tech-
nical explanation in existence at the time of a particular treaty's negotiation,
at least to the extent it did not object to the interpretation.1 3
Assuming the Supreme Court were to follow Alvarez-Machain in future
cases, this conclusion has some attraction, particularly if the negotiators fo-
cused significant attention on the then-existing model technical explanation
as part of the negotiation process. However, several practical considerations
significantly weaken the viability of this conclusion. First, the U.S. model
technical explanation is not the only interpretive source to which the nego-
tiators have access. In particular, to the extent that particular treaty language
appears in both the OECD Model Treaty as well as the U.S. model treaty, the
negotiators from the other country might be expected to have greater fami-
liarity with the OECD Commentary interpretations, rather than the U.S.
model technical explanation. In such circumstances, the case for finding im-
plicit assent to the model technical explanation is weaker. Moreover, as a
historical matter, the Treasury Department does not regularly update the U.S.
model treaty and the model technical explanation to reflect ever-evolving
treaty policies (in contrast to the OECD's more frequent updating of its
Commentaries), 214 so even though the model technical explanation might be
sent to the other country in advance of negotiations, it might not necessarily
reflect the then-current views of the Treasury Department and its negotiators
(let alone the other country's negotiators) at the time a particular treaty is
negotiated." 5
In addition to this potential lack of mutual assent between the treaty
negotiators, the model technical explanation has only limited relevance with
respect to the Senate consent process. Even under a very broad reading of
213. Townsend, supra note 22, at 242-43.
214. As the Treasury Department observed in the 1996 Model Technical Explanation, the
Treasury's treaty policies evolve over time:
[T]he Model is intended to be an ambulatory document that may be updated
from time to time to reflect further consideration of various provisions in light
of experience, subsequent treaty negotiations, economic, judicial, legislative or
regulatory developments in the United States, and changes in the nature or
significance of transactions between U.S. and foreign persons. The Technical
Explanation is also intended to be ambulatory, and may be expanded to deal
with new issues that may arise in the future.... The manner and timing of
such updates will be subsequently determined.
1996 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 5, tit. & pmbl. (emphasis added). Despite
this anticipated updating of the Model, no update was issued for ten years. See 2006 U.S. MODEL
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 16.
215. For example, the Treasury Department waited ten years before updating the 1996 U.S.
Model Treaty with the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty (and the corresponding technical explanations). See
supra note 214. During that time, the Treasury's policy on the interpretation of numerous
provisions evolved, as reflected in various changes to the actual treaties negotiated (and technical
explanations published) during that decade. This phenomenon is, perhaps, most noticeable in the
evolution of the pension provisions (Article 18) and the limitation-on-benefits provisions
(Article 22) of the models. For a detailed comparison of the 1996 and 2006 Model Treaties, see
TIrTLE & AvI-YONAH, supra note 52.
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Stuart, the existence of the model technical explanation does not necessarily
reflect understanding or assent. As noted above, the U.S. model treaty and
model technical explanation are updated irregularly and might not necessar-
ily reflect the most recent policies as of the time the treaty is negotiated, so
the Senate, at least implicitly, might be reluctant to place too much emphasis
on their contents when approving an actual treaty. Indeed, in a 2001 report,
the staff of the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) explicitly
criticized the lack of regular updating of the model treaty.216 The JCT staff
report recommended that the Treasury Department should update and publish
a current version of the U.S. model treaty once during each Congress.217 The
recommendation noted that "[f]or purposes of clarity and transparency in this
area, the U.S. model tax treaties should reflect the most current positions on
U.S. treaty policy.
218
While the recommendation focused on updating the model treaty itself,
presumably the recommendation contemplated that the corresponding model
technical explanation would also be updated regularly. After all, an update
of the model treaty itself would only reveal those developments in U.S. treaty
policy that were significant enough (in the Treasury's view) to warrant a
change in the treaty language; it would not reveal developments in the
Treasury's preferred interpretation of existing treaty language, particularly
when the Treasury viewed the changes as not sufficient enough to warrant a
change in the treaty language.
This JCT staff recommendation, if adopted by the Treasury, would
strengthen the relevance of the model technical explanation under Alvarez-
Machain. In particular, by more clearly and reliably identifying the United
States' interpretation of the model treaty at a particular time, a stronger case
can be made that a treaty partner negotiating a treaty at that time would be
aware of relevant U.S. legal doctrines, thereby justifying the application of
the Alvarez-Machain principle (at least to the extent there was not contrary
evidence, such as a contrary interpretation in the OECD Commentaries).
However, in the absence of such regular- updates reflecting then-current
views, the model technical explanation in existence at the time a treaty is
216. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., 2 STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO
SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION TO SIMPLIFY THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 446
(Comm. Print 2001).
217. Id. at 447.
218. Id. at 446. While this recommendation was based, in part, on the desire for clarity and
uniformity in U.S. treaty policy, it also reflected institutional concerns-in particular, a desire to
keep the Senate and relevant congressional staff informed of the Treasury's evolving policies,
thereby placing a greater emphasis on the Senate's "advice" role in the treaty process. According to
the report, in developing its regular updates to the model treaty, "the Treasury Department should
consult in advance with the Congress as to new treaty policies that are being considered for
inclusion in an updated model treaty, as well as other issues that are relevant to the updating of U.S.
treaty policy." Id. at 447.
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negotiated should be given little, if any, weight in interpreting that treaty.
Even a Treasury Department official responsible for tax treaty issues recently
acknowledged that the model technical explanation is "'not an authoritative
interpretation of the meaning of model-based treaties.' ,,
219
4. Previously Published Technical Explanations for Other Treaties.-In
addition to the U.S. model technical explanation in existence at the time of a
particular treaty's negotiation, many actual technical explanations exist with
respect to previously negotiated and ratified tax treaties. The case for defer-
ring to the interpretation in one of those preexisting technical explanations in
interpreting a more recent treaty is even weaker than the case for using the
model technical explanation.
First, given that separate technical explanations exist for dozens of
existing treaties, in the absence of specific evidence arising from the
negotiations, there is no reason to believe that the negotiators would have
focused on any particular technical explanation among the many.
Accordingly, if different technical explanations reflect different
interpretations of the same treaty language, there is no basis to conclude that
any particular one reflected the shared understanding of the negotiators of a
subsequent treaty. Similarly, in the context of the Senate advice-and-consent
process, there is no reason to believe that any particular previously existing
technical explanation reflected the Senate's understanding of the treaty at
issue. As a result, no weight should be given to an interpretation that hap-
pens to appear in the technical explanation of a previously existing treaty
with another country, unless there is evidence that the negotiators (or the
Senate under a broad reading of Stuart) took notice of that particular
preexisting interpretation during the negotiations or advice-and-consent
process.
C. Subsequent Technical Explanations
The preceding subpart addressed the interpretive weight, if any, to be
accorded technical explanations created prior to, or in conjunction with, a
particular tax treaty being interpreted. The present subpart considers the
weight to be accorded technical explanations created after the treaty at issue
has entered into force. This group of technical explanations includes subse-
quent modifications to the model technical explanation and also technical
explanations to subsequently negotiated treaties with other countries to the
extent they interpret the same treaty language. As the following analysis
demonstrates, these subsequent technical explanations are entitled to little
weight, if any, in interpreting previously existing treaties, thereby precluding
219. Lee A. Sheppard, Treasury Official Fends Off Treaty Questions, 45 TAX NOTES INT'L 221
(2007), available at 45 Tax Notes Int'l 221 (Lexis) (quoting Benedetta Kissel, Deputy International
Tax Counsel for Treaty Affairs).
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the use of subsequent technical explanations as a form of ambulatory treaty
guidance.
1. Analogy to Ambulatory OECD Commentary.-Before focusing on
the relevance of ambulatory technical explanations under U.S. legal
principles, it is informative to consider their relevance under Vienna
Convention principles. As discussed above, numerous commentators already
have considered the analogous question regarding the authority of ambula-
tory OECD Commentary under Vienna Convention principles.22 ° These
commentators generally have concluded that such subsequently developed
guidance has little relevance because of the Vienna Convention's focus on
the shared understanding of the parties at the time the treaty was
negotiated. 1  Given the fragile standing of ambulatory OECD
Commentaries under the Vienna Convention principles, it is not surprising
that ambulatory technical explanations issued by the Treasury Department,
such as a revision to the U.S. model technical explanation, have almost no
relevance under these Vienna Convention principles in interpreting pre-
viously existing treaties. At its most benign, the new technical explanation
language might merely amplify the ordinary meaning of treaty terms through
the addition of examples that are consistent with the previously existing un-
derstandings of the provision. Of course, the line between a mere
clarification and something more is not clear and therefore raises interpretive
222issues of its own. Moreover, if the new technical explanation language
merely reflects the existing meaning of existing treaty language, then it adds
nothing to the result that would have otherwise resulted under Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention. 2 3
Assuming that the new technical explanation language purports to do
more--e.g., to fill a gap not otherwise resolved by Article 3 1, to reflect what
states have been doing in practice, or to contradict a meaning otherwise re-
sulting from the application of Article 3 1-the new language will have no
relevance under the Vienna Convention principles. As discussed above,
documents are relevant in providing interpretive "context" under Article 31
only if they reflect an agreement between the parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty or an instrument made by one of the parties and
220. See supra section III(A)(2).
221. See IFA STUDY, supra note 21, at 80 (concluding that the ambulatory OECD
Commentaries are entitled to little interpretive weight under the principles of the Vienna
Convention).
222. Cf id. at 79 (noting that the classification of ambulatory OECD Commentaries as merely
amplifying existing commentaries, rather than doing something more, does not reflect "entirely
separate categories").
223. See id. at 80 (noting that in the context of ambulatory OECD Commentaries, "if the
interpretation [of the treaty language] is clear and unambiguous, the words in the particular tax
treaty do not require references to the commentaries to be interpreted").
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224accepted by the other party as related to the treaty. A later change to the
language of the Treasury Department's model technical explanation, or a
later change reflected in the technical explanation of some other U.S. tax
treaty, clearly would not constitute such an agreement between the United
States and a party to an existing tax treaty. Indeed, even the original tech-
nical explanation accompanying a particular treaty generally does not meet
this strict definition of context because a technical explanation is prepared
unilaterally by the Treasury Department as part of the Senate consent process
(i.e., after the two countries have signed the treaty), and the other country
generally does not provide its consent to the document.225
New language in a model technical explanation (or technical
explanation regarding a subsequent treaty with a different country) would
also not constitute the other types of relevant material to be taken into ac-
count under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. With respect to
Article 31(3), it would not constitute a subsequent agreement between the
parties, and it would not necessarily reflect subsequent practice in the appli-
cation of the treaty reflecting the parties' agreement. To the extent the new
language happened to reflect such subsequent practice, Article 31(3) would
look to the subsequent practice regardless of the new technical explanation
language. Finally, the new technical explanation language would not be rel-
evant regarding a "special meaning" under Article 31(4) because the new
technical explanation language sheds no light on the intent of the parties to a
previously negotiated treaty.
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention also provides little support for the
use of later technical explanation language in interpreting a previously ex-
isting treaty. That Article permits recourse to supplementary means of
interpretation-most importantly information regarding "the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion"226--to determine
the meaning of treaty language only when the meaning of terms is
"ambiguous or obscure, 227 or when the interpretation would otherwise be
"manifestly absurd or unreasonable., 228  Even if these conditions were
satisfied, a unilateral declaration in a later technical explanation would not
constitute the relevant travaux pr~paratoires contemplated by the Article.
224. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, art. 31(2).
225. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. One exception would be in the rare
circumstance where the United States and the other treaty country jointly agree to the language in
the technical explanation. For example, the United States and Canada recently agreed to a technical
explanation to the protocol to the U.S.-Canada income tax treaty. See supra note 179. Such a
document would appear to constitute an "instrument which was made by one or more
parties ... and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty" within the
meaning of Article 31(2), thereby permitting its provisions to serve as interpretive context in
determining the meaning of the underlying treaty. See Vienna Convention, supra note 67,
art. 31(2)(b).
226. Id. art. 32.
227. Id. art. 32(a).
228. Id. art. 32(b).
1108 [Vol. 87:1063
2009] The Limits of Administrative Guidance 1109
Even the technical explanation of a particular treaty generally is not viewed
as relevant under this standard because it is merely a unilateral document
prepared by one party (and not necessarily accepted by the other party) after
the treaty has been signed.229 Accordingly, ambulatory language in Treasury
Department technical explanations-including new language in a revised
model technical explanation or different language appearing in a more recent
technical explanation to a different tax treaty-has little or no relevance un-
der the Vienna Convention in interpreting the provisions of a previously
existing tax treaty.
2. Limited Authority Under U.S. Legal Principles.-As discussed
above, a technical explanation has no formal legal status under U.S.
administrative-law principles, and therefore is not, standing alone, entitled to
deference.23° Instead, its only relevance, if any, arises in the context of
treaty-interpretation principles. Although a subsequently published technical
explanation has no relevance in interpreting previously ratified treaties under
Vienna Convention interpretation principles, as discussed previously, U.S.
courts sometimes have been willing to consider a broader range of materials
than are permitted under the Vienna Convention. 231 Even under this looser
U.S. approach, however, subsequent technical explanations have little rele-
vance as ambulatory means of interpreting existing tax treaties.
Most notably, the Supreme Court in Stuart, by citing the Senate floor
debate regarding the 1975 U.S.-Canada income tax treaty, indicated a wil-
lingness to look at the understanding of the Senate in giving its advice and
consent. While a broad reading of Stuart might support reference to the
unilateral technical explanation prepared (and submitted to the Senate) with
respect to the treaty at issue,232 this reasoning does not support reference to a
subsequently prepared technical explanation in interpreting a previously ex-
isting treaty. After all, the subsequently prepared technical explanation was
not available to, and played no role in, the Senate giving consent to the ear-
lier treaty.
Moreover, as noted above, some disagreement existed between the
Justices regarding the extent to which that floor debate reflected merely the
unilateral understanding of the Senate or the implicit mutual agreement of
229. See IFA STUDY, supra note 21, at 72 ("What seems to be clear in international law is that
unilateral interpretive declarations are not binding on the other contracting party or parties although
they do become binding if and when the declaring state consents to be bound by the treaty only if
the specific interpretation set out in the interpretive declaration is accepted."); id. at 70 n.170 ("[T]o
the extent that such documents do not reproduce the content of letters or notes exchanged during the
negotiation of the treaty, they fall outside the scope of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention." (citing KLAUS VOGEL ET AL., KLAUS VOGEL ON DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS
(John Main & Bruce Elvin trans., 3ded. 1997))).
230. See supra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
23 1. See supra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 205-09.
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233both treaty partners. To the extent that Justice Brennan's use of Senate
materials in Stuart depends on his assertion that the Senate materials reflect
an implicit assent by the treaty partner, rather than merely a unilateral under-
standing by the Senate (because the materials are public and the other
country did not object), the case for looking to subsequently created technical
explanations is even weaker. After all, even under a very broad reading of
implicit assent, the other country cannot be viewed as assenting to a docu-
ment that does not yet exist at the time the treaty is ratified.
An argument might be made that a subsequent technical explanation-
most likely an update to the model technical explanation-should be relied
on to the extent it reflects the existing practice of countries interpreting sim-
ilar treaty language in existing treaties. The Supreme Court, consistent with
(but not explicitly relying on) Vienna Convention principles, 234 permits refer-
ence to the existing practice of the countries in order to ascertain the
countries' mutual understanding of the treaty.235 This argument might be
strengthened to the extent the subsequent technical explanation reflects de-
velopments in the OECD Commentaries, 236 particularly to the extent that the
other country whose tax treaty is at issue is an OECD member and did not
express an observation or reservation regarding the OECD Commentary.
However, as a practical matter, this argument has little effect. As a factual
matter, updating the model treaty does not provide evidence of the practice of
the partner to an existing treaty. To the extent evidence of such practice does
exist, the promulgation of a new model treaty would be superfluous.
Similarly, to the extent the model technical explanation reflects
developments in the OECD Commentary, and those developments reflect
existing treaty practice, the revision of the model technical explanation has
little additional relevance.
As a final consideration, the Supreme Court has stated that "the
meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight., 237 While
the Treasury Department (with the assistance of the IRS) prepares the model
technical explanation, this dicta does not justify the use of the subsequent
technical explanation interpretations. As previously discussed, the technical
explanation to a subsequent actual treaty might, at least in theory, merely re-
flect the understanding in that particular negotiation, rather than an
interpretation of the earlier treaty.238 Moreover, the model technical explana-
tion does not represent a formal position of the Treasury Department, so it
233. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
235. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989).
236. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
237. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176,
184-85 (1982)).
238. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
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should not be relied on in this context. In contrast, a Treasury regulation
does constitute a more formal position and might be entitled to greater
weight in this context. The role of regulations is discussed in Part V.
3. Taxpayer Reliance on Subsequent Technical Explanations.-
a. Legal Authority.-The current practice of the Treasury
Department-whereby evolving treaty policy and interpretations are not
regularly published in a frequently updated model treaty and technical
explanation, but instead are revealed in an ad hoc manner through newly
negotiated treaties and their corresponding technical explanations-creates a
significant potential administrative problem for the government. As just
discussed, a court should not give weight to these subsequently issued
technical explanations when interpreting an already-existing treaty.
Accordingly, to the extent that the subsequent technical explanations contain
interpretations favorable to the government, they will not help the govern-
ment in litigation concerning an earlier treaty.
Nonetheless, in those cases where a subsequent technical explanation
contains an interpretation favorable to taxpayers, taxpayers and their advisors
might attempt to rely on the subsequent technical explanation when deter-
mining the application of a previously existing treaty.239 Even though the
subsequent technical explanation is not binding and might not be entitled to
any deference in interpreting the earlier treaty if the matter goes to litigation
(for the reasons discussed above), taxpayers and their advisors might none-
theless attempt to rely on that favorable subsequent technical explanation for
purposes of reporting. The New York State Bar Association Tax Section, in
its detailed comments on the 2006 U.S. Model Treaty, explicitly focused on
this aspect of technical explanations (in particular the Model Technical
Explanation):
Construing language in the 2006 Model that is often identical to that
in existing treaties, the [Model] Technical Explanation makes
statements as to intended meaning that may or may not be repeated in
the technical explanations of specific tax treaties or protocols.
Moreover, not all technical explanations of essentially identical treaty
language are the same. In cases where the treaty language is
substantively the same, can these statements be relied upon in
interpreting treaties?
240
As discussed earlier, good arguments support a taxpayer's ability to rely
on an interpretation contained in the technical explanation to the particular
239. This discussion assumes that the earlier treaty that applies to the taxpayer contains similar
or identical treaty language to that of the subsequent treaty that the subsequent technical explanation
is interpreting.
240. NYSBA REPORT, supra note 20, at 3-4.
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treaty at issue. 24' These arguments, however, do not allow a taxpayer to bind
the IRS to an interpretation in the technical explanation to another treaty or
subsequent modifications to the model technical explanation. First, another
treaty's technical explanation might reflect a particular understanding
reached during the negotiations of that other treaty and therefore would not
necessarily reflect the mutual understanding of the negotiators of the treaty at
242issue. Moreover, even to the extent that a technical explanation is relevant
under the Stuart rationale by reason of its inclusion in the Senate consent
process, that rationale extends only to the technical explanation of the partic-
ular treaty under consideration by the Senate. A subsequent treaty's
technical explanation does not necessarily reflect the understanding of the
Senate that consented to the earlier treaty, nor could it be viewed as reflect-
ing any kind of implicit mutual understanding of the treaty partner to the
earlier treaty even under a broad reading of Stuart. Accordingly, a taxpayer
cannot pick and choose among subsequent treaties' technical explanations
and expect to be able to bind the IRS to the most favorable one.
b. Avoidance of Penalties.-Even if the taxpayer cannot
conclusively rely on subsequent technical explanations in interpreting an
earlier treaty, these subsequent technical explanations might enable the tax-
payer to take a favorable reporting position and avoid potential penalties if a
court ultimately rules against the taxpayer on the treaty-interpretation issue.
Under Internal Revenue Code § 6662, a taxpayer might be subject to signifi-
cant penalties if a court ultimately finds that the taxpayer's position taken on
a return was incorrect and resulted in a substantial understatement of income
tax.243 However, this penalty does not apply to the extent that (i) "there is or
244was substantial authority" for the taxpayer's position, 2  or (ii) the taxpayer
adequately discloses the relevant facts on the tax return and there is a
"reasonable basis" for the position.245
The relevant Treasury regulations provide that "[t]here is substantial
authority for the tax treatment of an item only if the weight of the authorities
supporting the treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of authorities
supporting contrary treatment. ' '246 For purposes of this inquiry, relevant au-
thorities include "tax treaties and regulations thereunder, and Treasury
241. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text; see also ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT,
supra note 23, at 60-61 ("Whatever the weight to be given to unilateral materials in the treaty
interpretative process ... a taxpayer should be allowed to rely on such material to the same extent
that reliance could be placed on similar administrative interpretations of a statute.").
242. As discussed above, each treaty's technical explanation often contains a self-serving
statement that it reflects the understandings reached by the negotiators, although this boilerplate
language might raise questions as to its factual accuracy. See supra notes 197-99 and
accompanying text.
243. I.R.C. §§ 6662(b)(2), (d) (2000).
244. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).
245. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii).
246. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 2003).
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Department and other official explanations of such treaties. 247 Under this
standard, and particularly given the use of the plural form of "treaties" and
"official explanations," a taxpayer might be able to pick and choose among
differing technical explanations from various treaties in order to establish
"substantial authority." The regulations provide some limited guidance in
determining how various authorities should be weighed in order to determine
whether there is "substantial authority." For example, "[t]he type of
document. . . must be considered ... [and] the persuasiveness and relevance
of a document, viewed in light of subsequent developments, should be taken
into account." 248 This standard suggests that the technical explanation to the
actual treaty at issue should be given greater weight than a subsequent
treaty's technical explanation for purposes of determining "substantial
authority," given the importance of the actual treaty's technical explanation
in the Senate consent process for that treaty. However, if the actual treaty's
technical explanation is silent or unclear regarding a particular interpretation,
the regulations leave room for subsequent technical explanations, including
updates to the model technical explanation, to be considered.249
As mentioned above,25° if a taxpayer adequately disclosed the relevant
facts on the tax return, the taxpayer can avoid the substantial underpayment
penalty merely by showing a "reasonable basis" for the position,251 rather
than having to meet the more stringent "substantial authority" standard.
252
As a practical matter, taxpayers facing the treaty-interpretation issues ad-
dressed herein generally will be subject to this lower standard, assuming they
have complied with the separate provision of the Internal Revenue Code that
247. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
248. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii).
249. The regulation states that "[a]n older private letter ruling, technical advice memorandum,
general counsel memorandum or action on decision generally must be accorded less weight than a
more recent one. Any document described in the preceding sentence that is more than 10 years old
generally is accorded very little weight." Id. Although this provision does not explicitly apply to
technical explanations, it might be argued that it places greater weight on interpretations contained
in more recent technical explanations than older technical explanations, particularly if the technical
explanation to the treaty at hand is silent on the issue. However, caution should be exercised in
relying on this provision to justify placing significant weight on a newer technical explanation that
is inconsistent with the technical explanation to the actual treaty. Whereas the IRS generally has the
authority to modify its existing interpretations of a statute by issuing newer private letter rulings and
related documents (and thus the newer guidance is given greater weight under this standard), the
treaty-interpretation principles discussed earlier generally do not permit an ambulatory change to an
existing treaty pursuant to subsequent technical explanations, and there is no reason to believe that a
newer technical explanation reflects a more accurate interpretation of the language in an older
treaty.
250. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
25 1. The regulations define "reasonable basis" by describing it in relation to what it is not-it is
"significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper" and "is not satisfied by a return
position that is merely arguable or that is merely a colorable claim." Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3)
(as amended in 2003).
252. See id. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (as amended in 2003) (observing that the "substantial authority"
standard is "more stringent than the reasonable basis standard").
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generally requires disclosure of treaty-based return positions. 253 As with the
substantial-authority inquiry, the taxpayer must consider "the relevance and
persuasiveness of the authorities, and subsequent developments,, 254 but need
only demonstrate that the position is reasonably based on one or more of
these authorities. 255 While this standard still seems to place the most rele-
vance on the technical explanation to the particular treaty at issue, it creates
additional leeway to rely on interpretations in more recent technical
explanations. This reasonable-basis standard, if satisfied, will also protect
the tax-return preparer from penalties, assuming there was adequate disclo-
sure on the taxpayer's return.256
V. Defending (Limited) Ambulatory Administrative Guidance
A. Ambulatory Guidance via Changes to "U.S. Law"
As the prior Part demonstrated, U.S. courts have been willing to look at
supplemental materials beyond those contemplated by the Vienna
Convention when interpreting treaties. However, even when Supreme Court
precedent is interpreted broadly, it does not support deference to subse-
quently published technical explanations-whether model or in the context
of actual treaties with other countries-when interpreting an earlier tax
treaty. The principal shortcoming of these subsequent technical explanations
is that they do not constitute either direct or indirect evidence of the mutual
understanding between the United States and the other party to the earlier
treaty. Accordingly, the Treasury Department's historic approach to evolv-
ing interpretations of tax treaty language that is common to many treaties-
i.e., through infrequent updates to the model technical explanation, along
with ad hoc modifications reflected periodically in newer treaties' technical
explanations-fails to establish a uniform source of interpretation that is en-
titled to deference by U.S. courts under general treaty-interpretation
principles. Moreover, as previously discussed, this ad hoc approach provides
taxpayers with latitude to pick and choose among various technical explana-
tions in establishing their reporting positions.
This Part considers another potential approach that might provide the
Treasury Department with greater ability to develop ambulatory administra-
tive guidance that is entitled to at least some deference in applying
253. See I.R.C. § 6114 (2000) (requiring treaty-position disclosure, which is made on IRS Form
8833).
254. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (as amended in 2003).
255. Id.
256. See I.R.C. § 6694(a) (2000 & Supp. 2009) (protecting the tax-return preparer if there was
adequate disclosure and a reasonable basis for the position). Under recent amendments to the
Internal Revenue Code, the standards for a tax-return preparer to avoid penalties when there has not
been adequate disclosure are now the same as those that apply to the taxpayer. See id.
§ 6694(a)(2)(A) (protecting the tax-return preparer if there was no disclosure but there was
"substantial authority" for the position).
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preexisting treaties. As discussed above, tax treaties contain provisions that,
by their express terms, envision a role for some unilateral developments after
a treaty enters into force.257 For example, Article 3(2) of both the OECD
Model Treaty and the U.S. Model Treaty (as well as actual treaties based
thereon) provides that any term not defined in the treaty shall have the
meaning that it has at the time the treaty is applied under the laws of the
country whose tax is at stake.258 In addition, Article 23 provides that the for-
eign tax credit provided by the United States is "subject to the limitations of
the law of the United States (as it may be amended from time to time without
changing the general principle hereof)., 259 References to the application of
internal law also appear in numerous other treaty provisions.2 60 The follow-
ing analysis considers the extent to which the Treasury Department can
promulgate administrative guidance that will be respected under these
provisions, and also considers whether any other interpretive principles
261might justify the applicability of subsequent Treasury regulations.
1. Inapplicability of Technical Explanations and Revenue Rulings.-
Articles 3(2) and 23 contemplate that the application of the treaty might
change as the internal law of the country whose tax is at stake changes. As
discussed above, technical explanations are not entitled to special deference
and do not have the effect of law under general administrative-law principles.
For example, if the Treasury Department were to update the model technical
explanation to set forth a new meaning for a term not explicitly defined in the
treaty, that interpretation would not be the law of the United States.262 No
reasonable argument exists for deferring to a technical explanation in inter-
preting the law of the United States independent of the treaty.263
Accordingly, an interpretation contained in an update to the model technical
explanation could not bootstrap itself onto an earlier treaty pursuant to
Article 3(2) or any other article of that treaty that looks to definitions
contained in "the law" of the United States. Even if the Treasury Department
were to adopt the JCT staff recommendation and publish regular updates to
257. See supra notes 154-67 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
261. As discussed above, the mutual-agreement procedure of Article 25 also provides for
ambulatory interpretations after a treaty enters into force. See supra notes 154-56 and
accompanying text. Because that provision has relevance only when the two countries' competent
authorities mutually agree, it is not directly relevant to the unilateral interpretations that are the
focus of this Article.
262. At most, a technical explanation might have limited relevance in interpreting the terms of a
particular treaty under the treaty-interpretation principles discussed previously.
263. Technical explanations often contain brief summaries of relevant Code provisions. See,
e.g., 2006 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 16, art. 7 (providing brief
descriptions of the treatment of certain items of income under the existing Code and regulations).
No one could reasonably argue that these brief interpretations constitute binding U.S. law by reason
of the descriptions in the Model Technical Explanation.
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the model treaty (and, presumably, the model technical explanation), 64 those
regular updates to the model technical explanation would not constitute U.S.
law and would not be relevant for purposes of Article 3(2). Similarly, inter-
pretations of U.S. law contained in revenue rulings do not constitute "U.S.
law, 265 and therefore revenue rulings cannot be used as a vehicle for issuing
ambulatory changes that will be given effect under Article 3(2).
The Tax Court addressed this issue in Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Commissioner,266 reaching the same conclusion in the context of Article 23
of the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty.267 That Article, like the corresponding provision
of the Model Treaty discussed above, made the taxpayer's foreign tax credit
"subject to the limitations of the law of the United States (as it may be
amended from time to time without changing the general principle
hereof). 268 In Compaq, the IRS cited the technical explanation to the U.S.
U.K. treaty and a revenue ruling, both of which purported to limit the
taxpayer's ability to claim a foreign tax credit.269 The Tax Court concluded
"that neither the Technical Explanation nor [the revenue ruling] is to be con-
sidered 'the law of the United States' for the purposes of [Article 23].y27
0
The U.S. Claims Court in Snap-On Tools v. United States also rejected the
relevance of technical explanations in determining the limitations of U.S. law
for purposes of Article 23.27I
2. Regulations as U.S. Law for Purposes ofArticles 3(2) and 23.-
a. Regulations as U.S. Law.-While technical explanations and
revenue rulings do not constitute U.S. law for purposes of those treaty
provisions that look to U.S. law, a different result may occur when the
Treasury Department publishes guidance in the form of regulations.272 Under
264. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text; cf Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. United States,
26 Cl. Ct. 1045, 1060 (1992) (indicating that technical advice memoranda and general counsel
memoranda are "not binding authority"), aft'd, 26 F.3d 137 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
266. 113 T.C. 363 (1999).
267. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., art. 23, Dec. 31, 1975, 31 U.S.T.
5668.
268. Id. art. 23(1).
269. Compaq Computer, 113 T.C. at 370-71.
270. Id. at 372.
271. Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1045, 1075 (1992) (stating that technical
explanations may not be used to amend a treaty, and therefore suggesting that technical
explanations have limited relevance), afI'd, 26 F.3d 137 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Snap-On Tools is
discussed in more detail at infra notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
272. This analysis focuses on the promulgation of Treasury regulations pursuant to a grant of
authority under U.S. statutory law. In contrast, some early income tax treaties provided express
grants of authority to a contracting state to prescribe regulations necessary to carry into effect that
particular treaty. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz., art. XIX, May 24, 1951, 2 U.S.T. 1751 ("[C]ompetent authorities of
1116 [Vol. 87:1063
2009] The Limits of Administrative Guidance 1117
Mead, a Treasury regulation is entitled to Chevron deference if it "appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules car-
rying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority [through] notice-and-
comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable
congressional intent. ''273  The Internal Revenue Code contains specific
authority for numerous regulations whose application (at least indirectly)
impacts tax treaties, including regulations affecting the branch profits tax,274
certain hybrid entities,175 anticonduit concerns, 276 and some aspects of the
foreign tax credit limitations.277 There is widespread agreement that these
specific-authority regulations satisfy the Mead standard and are entitled to
Chevron deference. 278 The Code also contains a general grant of regulation-
making authority to the Treasury in § 7805(a).279 While there had been some
question as to the level of deference accorded regulations promulgated under
§ 7805, following the Supreme Court's decision in Mead, there is increasing
agreement among circuit courts and scholars that these regulations also are
entitled to Chevron deference.28°
the two contracting States may prescribe regulations necessary to carry into effect the present
Convention within the respective States."); Convention Respecting Double Taxation, U.S.-Can.,
art. XVIII, Mar. 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1399 ("[C]ompetent authorities of the two contracting States may
prescribe regulations to carry into effect the present Convention within the respective States and
rules with respect to the exchange of information."). For examples of regulations promulgated
under this treaty-specific authority, see, e.g., T.D. 5206, 1943 C.B. 526 (providing for regulations
under the 1942 U.S.-Canada treaty). See also Samann v. Comm'r, 313 F.2d 461, 462-63 (4th Cir.
1963) (citing regulations promulgated pursuant to the 1951 U.S.-Switzerland treaty). Many of
these old treaty-authorized regulations have been removed as obsolete. See, e.g., T.D. 8228, 1988-2
C.B. 136, 173 (removing regulations under nine tax treaties); see also RHOADES & LANGER, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION & TAX TREATIES § 49.02 (2008) (noting that no new treaty-authorized
regulations have been issued since 1969).
273. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (interpreting the limits of
Chevron deference).
274. I.R.C. § 884(g) (2000).
275. I.R.C. § 894(c)(2) (2000).
276. I.R.C. § 7701(l) (2000).
277. I.R.C. § 904 (2000).
278. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1559-63 (2006) (noting that the ABA Tax Section's Task Force
on Judicial Deference and scholars outside the Task Force recommend Chevron deference for
specific-authority Treasury regulations).
279. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000) (authorizing "all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any
alteration of law in relation to internal revenue").
280. E.g., Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 515 F.3d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2008) (reversing the
Tax Court and holding that a regulation promulgated under I.R.C. § 7805(a)'s general grant of
authority is entitled to Chevron deference); Hickman, supra note 278, at 1600-19; see also Steve R.
Johnson, Swallows Holding: Chevron's Growing Traction in Tax Litigation, 27 A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N
NEWS Q. 1, 10, 11 (2008) ("The trend is in the direction of Chevron, but the Third Circuit's opinion
[in Swallows Holding] was premature in implying that the issue is settled or nearly so."). Of course,
a regulation entitled to Chevron deference is not automatically valid. The regulation is upheld only
if it satisfies the two-part Chevron test: (1) the statute is silent or ambiguous regarding the matter
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Provided that the specific- or general-authority regulation is valid under
Chevron deference, the regulation has the "force and effect of law,, 281 and
accordingly, it should apply with respect to those treaty provisions-such as
the reference in Article 3(2) to terms not otherwise defined in the treaty, or
the reference to internal-law limitations on the foreign tax credit under
Article 23-that explicitly defer to the law of the United States. Indeed, it
would be extremely difficult to interpret the Article 23 reference to internal-
law limitations without reference to Treasury regulations because the large
majority of details regarding the foreign tax credit limitation are contained in
regulations, rather than the tax code.282
Klaus Vogel, in his extensive analysis of income tax treaties from a
European perspective, supports this view that a country's domestic "law" for
purposes of Article 3(2) includes more than just statutory law.283 For
example, he concludes that both legislative and administrative laws
constitute German "law" for purposes of this provision.284 Similarly,
Professor Vogel concludes that the "law" of member states of the European
Union includes prevailing treaties, regulations, and directives.
285
The reasoning of the U.S. Claims Court in Snap-On Tools also supports
the conclusion that regulations generally constitute U.S. law for purposes of
those treaty provisions that defer to such law. In Snap-On Tools, the court
addressed a timing issue with respect to the creditability of the United
addressed by the regulation, and (2) the regulation is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984); see Hickman, supra note 278, at 1586 (criticizing less deferential interpretations of the
second step).
281. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301, 301-03 (1979); cf Richard L. Doemberg,
Treaty Override by Administrative Regulation: The Multiparty Financing Regulations, 2 FLA. TAX
REv. 521, 546-47 (1995) (discussing circumstances where Treasury regulations have the force and
effect of law); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack oJ)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1727, 1736-40 (2007) (questioning the Treasury's compliance with procedural requirements
with respect to some 7,805 regulations). Professor Doemberg addresses the limits of treating a
regulation as law in the context of the Supremacy Clause, considering the circumstances when a
regulation can override a contrary treaty provision. Doemberg, supra, at 548-50. This issue is not
relevant to the current discussion in the text, which involves circumstances where U.S. law, as
reflected in regulations, is consistent with and expressly referred to by the treaty language. Id. at
524 ("It is important to distinguish the use of domestic law to override treaties-a clear violation of
international law-from the lawful use of domestic law to define terms left undefined by treaty
[under Article 3(2)]."). Professor Doernberg's analysis of potential treaty override by regulation is
relevant to the discussion in subpart V(B), infra.
282. Compare Treas. Reg. §§ 1.904-0 to 1.9040)-l (as amended in 2008) (comprising over one
hundred small-print pages in the CCH publication), with I.R.C. § 904 (2000) (comprising twenty-
seven larger print pages, including historical notes, in the CCH publication).
283. KLAUS VOGEL ET AL., KLAUS VOGEL ON DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS 210-11
(John Marin & Bruce Elvin trans., 3ded. 1997).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 211.
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286
Kingdom advance corporation tax under the 1975 U.S.-U.K. tax treaty.
Although the Treasury regulations (as authorized by a relevant Code
provision) generally provided that a taxpayer could treat dividends paid in
the first sixty days of the year as having been paid from profits of the pre-
ceding year, the United States argued that this provision did not apply to the
U.K. tax that was made creditable by the treaty.287 The Government cited the
treaty's technical explanation, which gave the IRS authority to disregard the
sixty-day rule for purposes of the treaty.288 The court disagreed, concluding
that this technical explanation did not constitute U.S. law for purposes of ap-
plying the Article 23 limitation on creditability. 289 However, in dicta the
court acknowledged "that the Department of Treasury can change earlier in-
terpretations of law through the issuance ... of revisions to one of the
regulations, 29° thereby implying that a change in the law pursuant to regula-
291
tion would be respected as U.S. law for purposes of that treaty provision.
The Tax Court, in Estate of Burghardt v. Commissioner,292 also implied, in
dicta, that a regulation could constitute U.S. "law" for purposes of an estate-
tax-treaty provision similar to Article 3(2).293
Because Treasury regulations generally constitute U.S. law for purposes
of tax treaty provisions that explicitly defer to U.S. law, the promulgation of
regulations provides a possible avenue through which the Treasury
Department might effect ambulatory changes in the application of existing
treaties. However, this use of regulations is subject to important limitations.
286. Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1045 (1992), aff'd, 26 F.3d 137 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
287. Id. at 1052.
288. Id. at 1068-69.
289. Id. at 1075. The court also rejected the relevance of the technical explanation under the
1975 U.S.-U.K. tax treaty.
290. Id. at 1074.
291. The Snap-On Tools opinion contains some ambiguous language as to the role of
regulations as law for purposes of Article 23. After concluding that a technical explanation does not
constitute U.S. law for this purpose, the opinion states that Article 23 "clearly refers the taxpayer
back to the applicable United States Code provisions." Id. at 1075. In the context of the opinion,
this reference to the U.S. Code should not be viewed as exclusive (i.e., to the exclusion of
regulations). On the facts of the case, the relevant U.S. law upon which the taxpayer relied
happened to be contained in the Internal Revenue Code. See id. (focusing on the plain language of
I.R.C. § 902 (1976), which provided a foreign tax credit for taxes paid by certain subsidiaries).
However, the language quoted in the text regarding the Treasury's ability to change the
interpretation of law pursuant to regulations-particularly in contrast to the mere use of a technical
explanation that the court criticized-suggests that a change effected by a properly authorized
regulation would have been respected as U.S. law in this context.
292. 80 T.C. 705 (1983).
293. Id. at 711. The Burghardt case involved the interpretation of the term "specific
exemption" in an estate tax treaty, which contained a provision similar to Article 3(2) of the income
tax treaties. Id. at 707. The Tax Court, in concluding that the Article 3(2)-type provision did not
apply, observed "that neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the Treasury Regulations use the term
'specific exemption' in the estate tax area." Id. at 711. By examining the Treasury regulations, the
court implied that had the regulations defined the term, that definition would have constituted U.S.
"law" for purposes of the treaty article.
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The most significant limitations on the ability of one country to affect the
application of the treaty by unilateral changes in internal law appear in the
language of the treaties themselves. As noted above, the principal treaty
provisions that defer to internal law-i.e., the reference in Article 3(2) to
terms not otherwise defined in the treaty, and foreign tax credit limitations
under Article 23-contain explicit limits. 294  In the case of Article 3(2), an
internal-law definition does not apply "unless the context otherwise
requires, ' '295 while under Article 23 the foreign tax credit limits of U.S. law
apply only if they do not "chang[e] the general principle hereof.,
296
b. "Context" Limitation Under Article 3(2).-Numerous
commentators have addressed the circumstances in which an internal-law
definition will not apply because the "context otherwise requires. 297 As
summarized by Professor Vogel, both the wording of Article 3(2) and its
historical development suggest that the use of "context" to depart from an
internal-law definition should be the exception. 298 Because this departure can
occur only when "require[d]," "not every apparently convincing interpreta-
tion from the context should give rise to a divergence from the rule of
[Article 3(2)], but only those based on relatively strong arguments. 299
In determining whether this high standard for departure from the
domestic-law definition is satisfied, the OECD Commentary and 2006 Model
Technical Explanation,300 as well as Professor Vogel,30' suggest that the
294. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
295. OECD MODEL TREATY, supra note 4, art. 3(2).
296. 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 23.
297. Professor Vogel provides a thorough summary and analysis of the various positions
commentators have taken. See VOGEL, supra note 283, at 213-16. See generally ALl TAX TREATY
PROJECT, supra note 23, at 41 (discussing disagreements between those who argue that "every
effort should be made to find a contextually-based definition before turning to domestic law," and
those who argue that the context-based limitation is the exception and argue against a "systematic
preference" for contextual interpretation"); Schoenblum, supra note 6, art. V(D) n.895 (citing
commentators); Smith, supra note 22, at 878-82; cf Infanti, Reverse Hybrid, supra note 125, at 312
(citing this provision in arguing that proposed domestic reverse-hybrid regulations issued under
§ 894(c) are not consistent with some U.S. tax treaties).
298. VOGEL, supra note 283, at 214. While acknowledging that the current Model Treaty
language gives priority to the internal-law definition in the absence of strong context-based
arguments, Professor Vogel suggests that a revision of this language might be appropriate. Id. at
208-09. After citing a Germany-Sweden treaty that reverses the Model's priority by allowing the
use of internal law only when the context requires it, Professor Vogel observes that "[h]opefully,
this example will find followers." Id. at 209.
299. Id. at 214. The ALl Tax Treaty Project acknowledges that "[i]n any event, there will
clearly be a number of cases in which a specific interpretation will not be 'required' by the
context."' ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 41.
300. Both the OECD Commentary and the 2006 U.S. Model Technical Explanation
contemplate that the "context" includes the intention of the parties when the treaty was entered into.
However, the two documents focus on slightly different time periods and actors in this regard. The
Commentary focuses on the "intention of the Contracting States when signing the Convention,"
OECD MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, commentary on art. 3, para. 12, while the Technical
Explanation focuses on "the intentions of the negotiators and of the Contracting States when the
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relevant "context" that can be considered is broad. For example, the context
can include not only the treaty text and supplementary materials, but also the
relevant definition under the other country's laws,3°2  the OECD
Commentaries, °3 and the underlying purpose of the treaty to avoid double
taxation and prevent fiscal evasion.30 4 However, as discussed above, even
with this broad definition of "context," the domestic-law definition will be
disregarded only when there are "'weighty arguments' in favour of such a
departure. ' 3 °5
For example, the OECD Model Treaty and the U.S. model treaties, as
well as the actual treaties based thereon, limit the source country's ability to
tax interest, dividends, and royalties if the "beneficial owner" of that income
is a resident of the other treaty country.30 6 The determination of beneficial
ownership raises significant complications with modem international-
financing and holding-company structures. 30 7 Because the term "beneficial
owner" is not defined in the text of the treaties, Article 3(2) permits reference
to the definition under U.S. law (assuming U.S. tax is at stake) unless the
context otherwise requires. Indeed, a Treasury official recently stated that
treaty was negotiated and ratified," 2006 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 16,
art. 3. Presumably, the Technical Explanation's inclusion of the ratification process leaves room for
considering interpretive issues raised during the Senate advice-and-consent process. The OECD
Commentary goes further than the Model Technical Explanation by also establishing context by
looking to "the meaning given to the term in question in the legislation of the other Contracting
State (an implicit reference to the principle of reciprocity on which the Convention is based)."
OECD MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, commentary on art. 3, para. 12.
301. Professor Vogel observes that the scope of the context contemplated by Article 3(2) is
different from the "context" referred to in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention. See VOGEL,
supra note 283, at 214.
302. See, e.g., OECD MODEL COMMENTARY, supra note 4, commentary on art. 3, para. 12
("The context is determined in particular by the intention of the Contracting States when signing the
Convention as well as the meaning given to the term in question in the legislation of the other
Contracting State.").
303. See VOGEL, supra note 283, at 215 (arguing that "context" should include the OECD
Commentaries).
304. See id. at 214. Indeed, Professor Vogel suggests that the mere fact that the application of
the domestic-law definition might lead to double taxation does not, standing alone, necessarily
mean that the context requires a departure from that domestic-law definition. See id.
305. Id. at 215 (citing authorities).
306. See supra note 27 (describing Articles 10, 11, and 12 of the treaties).
307. See, e.g., INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE INV.
VEHICLES AND PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS, OECD, THE
GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS WITH RESPECT TO THE INCOME OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT
VEHICLES 11 (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/26/41974553.pdf (discussing
controversy regarding the definition of "beneficial owner" in the context of tax treaties); Jakob
Bundgaard & Niels Winther-Sorensen, Beneficial Ownership in International Financing Structures,
50 TAX NOTES INT'L 587 (2008), available at 50 Tax Notes Int'l 587 (Lexis) (describing
interpretation of "beneficial ownership" with respect to OECD Model Treaty); Townsend, supra
note 22, at 265 (noting that "beneficial ownership" is an undefined term derived from a common
law concept, and a treaty partner may not be able to interpret the term, or it might not interpret the
term in such a way that is consistent with the United States' interpretation).
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the government is considering issuing regulations to clarify the meaning of
beneficial ownership for purposes of tax treaties.
308
If the Treasury Department were to issue regulations defining beneficial
ownership, the determination of whether the "context" requires a different
interpretation should not focus narrowly on the treaty negotiators' mutual
understanding or intent as to which particular individuals or entities would be
beneficial owners under particular facts. After all, many modem complex
financial structures might not have been contemplated by the treaty
negotiators, particularly if it is an older treaty in question. Instead, the focus
should be on the underlying purpose of the parties in limiting the treaty bene-
fits regarding interest, dividends, and royalties to the beneficial owner. As
long as the hypothetical regulation's definition, as applied under those treaty
provisions, is not inconsistent with that purpose, the definition should be
respected, even though it might address specific fact patterns not originally
contemplated by the negotiators of the particular treaty at issue.3 °9
The ALl Tax Treaty Project suggests an additional potential limitation
under Article 3(2), stating that "a country may [not] amend its law for the
exclusive purpose of altering the application of a treaty provision.',
310
Although it provides no explicit rationale, the ALl project's concern might
be grounded in the general principle that a treaty be interpreted in "good
faith., 31 1 As an example, it discusses a proposed bill 312 that would have rede-
fined certain corporate liquidation or redemption distributions as dividends
(rather than gains) solely in those circumstances where a treaty prohibits the
United States from taxing gains but allows it to tax dividends. 313 In all other
circumstances, the law would have retained the previously existing
definition, which might have treated a portion of the distribution as gain for
purposes of the Code. Thus, the new internal-law definition would only ap-
ply when it would expand U.S. taxing rights under the treaty and would not
apply under nontreaty circumstances. Although this example focuses on a
change in the law effected by a statute, the same analysis presumably would
apply to a change via regulations (assuming that the regulations were
valid).314
308. Nadal, supra note 18, at 92-32 (quoting Michael Mundaca, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Tax Affairs).
309. See ALl TAx TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 62 (providing examples of
circumstances where reference to domestic law is and is not consistent with the underlying purpose
of the treaty provision).
310. Id. at42.
311. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 325(1) (1987) ("An
international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
312. Foreign Tax Equity Bill of 1990, H.R. 4308, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990).
313. ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 42.
314. For a discussion of the authority for regulations in the context of Article 3(2), see supra
notes 273-91 and accompanying text.
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As the ALI Tax Treaty Project notes, this unilateral change in domestic
law would be inconsistent with the "context" of the treaty, as the treaty part-
ner would not have expected that the United States would carve out a special
definition that treats a transaction differently solely in circumstances that
benefit the United States under a treaty.3 15 Although the project describes the
problem as arising when the United States "amend[s] its law for the exclu-
sive purpose of altering the application of a treaty provision," 316 the concern
seems to be slightly more narrow than that. The principal concern with the
proposed bill was that it would have created inconsistent definitions: with a
special definition solely for purposes of applying treaties, while retaining a
different definition of the same transaction for purposes of the Code. 317 It is
possible to envision a regulation establishing a uniform definition of a term,
even though that term has its principal significance only in applying treaties.
As long as that definition does not result in the application of the substantive
treaty provisions in a manner that is inconsistent with the provision's
purpose, the context might not require that the definition be disregarded.
c. "General Principle" Limitation Under Article 23.-A similar
analysis applies in the context of Article 23, which expressly subjects the
foreign tax credit "to the limitations of the law of the United States (as it may
be amended from time to time without changing the general principle
hereof). '3 18 The taxpayer in a recent D.C. Circuit case expressed concern
that this cross-reference to ambulatory internal-law limitations on the foreign
tax credit might "allow the United States to deny the foreign tax credit to an
unlimited extent, and thus effectively eviscerate the benefits of
Article 23(l). ' '3I9 Because there had been no changes to the relevant internal-
law limitations since the treaty at issue had been negotiated, the D.C. Circuit
stated that it was unnecessary for the court to determine how far an internal-
law change could go "without changing the general principles" of the
Treaty.
320
315. See ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 42 (stating that "such selective overrides
could not have been intended by the drafters" of the relevant treaty provisions). Although not
directly on point, it is worth noting that the Treasury Department itself, in a nontreaty context, has
attempted to limit the ability of other countries to selectively enact tax provisions that apply only to
the extent that they produce U.S. tax benefits. The anti-"soak up" provision of the foreign tax credit
regulations provides that no tax credit is allowed with respect to a foreign tax if the foreign country
imposes the tax only in circumstances where the residence country (e.g., the United States) is
willing to give a credit for it. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1991).
316. ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 42.
317. See id. ("The effect of the proposed change would thus have been... no different in effect
from a direct legislative override of the affected treaty provisions.").
318. 2006 U.S. MODEL TREATY, supra note 5, art. 23(2).
319. Haver v. Comm'r, 444 F.3d 656, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The case involved the applicability
of the foreign tax credit limitation under the alternative minimum tax. The court noted that this
limitation had been in existence at the time the U.S.-Germany income tax treaty was negotiated,
and therefore the reference to amendments in U.S. law was not relevant. See id. at 658.
320. Id. at 659.
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The taxpayer's concern in that case is overstated. Indeed, the "without
changing the general principle hereof' language expressly prevents the
United States from changing its internal-law limitations in a way that would
eviscerate the benefits of Article 23. The general principle underlying
Article 23(2) is that the United States, when exercising residence-based
jurisdiction, must provide a foreign tax credit to the extent necessary to
eliminate double taxation, something that the Internal Revenue Code gener-
ally provides even in the absence of a tax treaty.32' Accordingly, the
touchstone inquiry is whether, after a change in the regulations addressing
the foreign tax credit limitation (or the underlying statute), the taxpayer is
still allowed tax-credit relief to the extent necessary to eliminate double tax-
ation of the same item of income. Given that the principal focus of these
regulations (and the underlying statute) is to prevent taxpayers from claiming
a foreign tax credit in circumstances when there has not been double
taxation,322 broad latitude exists for amendments in this area of U.S. law
(either by regulation or by statute) without changing the general principle of
Article 23.
3. Regulations in Other Treaty Contexts.-The viability of Treasury
regulations as a means to make ambulatory changes to the application of a
treaty is much more limited outside of those treaty provisions-e.g.,
Articles 3(2) and 23-that explicitly defer to U.S. law. Under those
provisions, a properly authorized and promulgated regulation obtains its sta-
tus by reason of its role as U.S. law, which is incorporated pursuant to the
terms of the treaty itself (subject to the "context" and other limitations dis-
cussed above).323 In contrast, outside of those treaty provisions, U.S.
regulations (as well as statutory law) have no special role under the terms of
the treaty, and, accordingly, the regulations have relevance only pursuant to
the general treaty-interpretation principles previously discussed.32 4
321. In this regard, the treaty provision does not add anything to the relief that a taxpayer would
already be entitled to under the Code. However, the treaty might provide certain additional
safeguards that would not otherwise be available under U.S. law. For example, Article 23(3)
provides a re-sourcing rule in the case of income that might otherwise by treated as U.S. source
income under the Code, thereby enabling the taxpayer to avoid certain limitations that otherwise
would apply under U.S. law. 2006 U.S. MODEL TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 16, art. 23,
para. 3.
322. See generally CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRANSACTIONS 371-90 (3d ed. 2006) (providing a general overview of policies underlying the U.S.
foreign tax credit limitation).
323. As the ALl Tax Treaty Project Report notes, Article 3(2) reflects "a lex specialis which
displaces in part the more generally applicable interpretative rules." ALl TAX TREATY PROJECT,
supra note 23, at 40.
324. See supra subpart Ill(B). Reinhold and Harrington note that the Government argued its
NatWest case based primarily on general treaty-interpretation principles and failed to press its
plausible argument that the regulations defined terms not otherwise defined in the treaty and should
be judged under the standards of Article 3(2). See Reinhold & Harrington, supra note 22, at 204
(noting that this failure was "enigmatic," and that "[b]ecause the government did not seriously press
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As discussed earlier, courts interpreting tax treaties often observe,
"Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the
Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is en-
titled to great weight. 325  The following analysis considers the extent to
which this dicta, as well as other interpretation principles, might support the
use of Treasury regulations in interpreting previously ratified tax treaties.
The purported deference given to the Executive agency charged with a
treaty's negotiation and enforcement might be grounded in concerns that the
President is the principal for ensuring that the United States speaks with one
326voice in foreign affairs with other countries. This concern about foreign
affairs is less pressing in the context of tax treaties, which focus on the rights
and liabilities of private taxpayers, rather than broader issues of foreign
327relations. As the Restatement of Foreign Relations notes, U.S. courts are
less likely to defer to executive interpretation in cases where individual rights
or interests are concerned.328
Accordingly, the deference, if any, owed to these Treasury regulations
must be grounded in more general principles underlying treaty interpretation.
As discussed above, because tax treaties are bilateral agreements between
two countries, courts generally attempt to discern the mutual understanding
of the parties.329 In so doing, U.S. courts (as well as the Vienna Convention)
place primary emphasis on the ordinary meaning of the treaty text to deter-
mine the parties' understanding. However, U.S. courts are often willing to
look to supplementary materials to ascertain that shared understanding.33 °
For example, courts have considered direct evidence of mutual understanding
from the negotiating history, 331 as well as indirect evidence, such as the
OECD Commentary in effect at the time the treaty was negotiated (assuming
this interpretation in the litigation, one is not clear what type of reception the argument might
receive in another setting").
325. This language comes from Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-
85 (1982). Numerous courts have favorably quoted this language. See, e.g., United States v. Smart,
489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989); Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest), 512 F.3d
1347, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Snap-On Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1045, 1071 (1992),
aff'd, 26 F.3d 137 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis removed); Estate of Silver v. Comm'r, 120 T.C. 430,
434 (2003); N.W. Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Comm'r, 107 T.C. 363, 378 (1996). The NatWest
opinion cautioned, however, that the agency's interpretation "merits less deference" when the other
treaty country disagrees with the interpretation. NatWest, 512 F.3d. at 1358 (citing Iceland S.S. Co.
v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 201 F.3d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
326. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 326 cmt. a (1987) (explaining
that the President's authority to interpret international agreements stems from his identity as the
country's "sole organ" in its international relations).
327. Arguably, the only significant foreign-affairs issue arising from tax treaties arises in the
rare circumstances where one country asserts that the other country has violated the terms of the
treaty.
328. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 326, reporter's note 2 (1987).
329. See supra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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the treaty text follows the then-current OECD Model Treaty).332  The
Supreme Court in Stuart was even willing to find implicit mutual
understanding based on the Senate floor debates during the advice-and-
consent process.333 Often, as in Stuart, a court states that the plain meaning
of the treaty text supports its conclusion and cites the supplementary mate-
rials merely as additional evidence of the already-declared plain-meaning
interpretation.
334
Within this framework, Treasury regulations promulgated after a treaty
has entered into force would seem to have little or no relevance.335 After all,
a later promulgated regulation provides no evidentiary weight in and of itself
as to the mutual understanding of the countries at the time the treaty was ne-
gotiated and ratified. While the later promulgated regulation might, in fact,
be consistent with the mutual understanding of the earlier treaty partners, this
coincidence does not give the regulation itself any weight.336
As posited earlier in the context of updates to the model technical
explanation,337 an argument might be made that a regulation should be given
weight to the extent that it reflects the existing practice of countries inter-
preting similar language in existing treaties. This argument might be at its
strongest when a regulation reflects developments in the OECD
Commentaries, particularly to the extent the other country whose tax treaty is
at issue is an OECD member and did not express an observation or reserva-
tion regarding the OECD Commentary. 338 However, the promulgation of the
regulation does not itself provide evidence of the practice of the treaty
partner (although it does provide stronger evidence of U.S. practice than does
an update to the model technical explanation). To the extent evidence of
such practice does exist, the promulgation of the regulation is largely
superfluous.
332. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest), 512 F.3d 1347, 1354-
59 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (supporting its conclusion that the United States had violated the terms of a
U.S.-U.K. tax treaty by referring first to the plain language of the treaty, and then finding additional
support through reference to supplementary evidence).
335. In contrast, a regulation existing at the time of a treaty's negotiation might be relevant
under general treaty-interpretation principles. In particular, to the extent the other country was
aware of the existing U.S. interpretation and did not object, the court might view that preexisting
regulation as evidence of shared understanding. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
This argument, however, would not necessarily preclude changes to preexisting regulations that
constitute "U.S. law" for purposes of applying Articles 3(2) or 23. As discussed previously, those
Articles contemplate that the U.S. law (including validly issued Treasury regulations) in existence at
the time of the treaty negotiation might change in the future and generally give respect to such
postratification changes in U.S. law.
336. In these circumstances, the regulation does not give any weight to the supplementary
materials that themselves establish the treaty partners' mutual understanding.
337. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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This skepticism regarding later enacted regulations (outside the context
of treaty provisions that explicitly defer to U.S. law, such as Articles 3(2)
or 23) is consistent with the recommendations of the ALl Tax Treaty Project,
which "would substantially limit the weight to be given to subsequently
promulgated administrative interpretations which are neither the product of a
competent authority agreement nor an interpretation that is clearly followed
by the treaty partner as well. 3 39 While the project focuses on revenue rul-
ings issued by the IRS, the same conclusion would apply to Treasury
regulations. Even though a Treasury regulation has significantly greater
weight than does a revenue ruling in the context of U.S. administrative law,
neither of them constitutes evidence of mutual understanding of a previously
negotiated treaty. Indeed, the project notes that once a treaty has been nego-
tiated and ratified, even legislative enactments do not constitute evidence of
the mutual understanding of a previously negotiated treaty.
340
The Federal Circuit's recent NatWest decision reflects this reluctance to
look to a subsequently enacted Treasury regulation as a means to interpret a
preexisting treaty under general treaty-interpretation principles.34' The rele-
vant issue in the case was whether Treasury regulations, which applied a
formula approach for determining the interest expenses of a United Kingdom
bank's U.S. branch, could apply, despite the 1975 U.S.-U.K. treaty's re-
quirement that the branch's profits be calculated as if the branch were a
"separate enterprise.,, 342  The court, applying general treaty-interpretation
principles, 343 focused on the mutual understanding of the parties at the time
they entered into the treaty.344 The court held that the plain language of the
treaty supported the conclusion that a formula approach was not allowed.345
The court then cited supplementary materials to demonstrate that its reading
of the plain meaning of the language was not inconsistent with the intent or
expectations of the signatories.346 This supplementary material included the
OECD Commentary in existence at the time (of which the negotiators would
339. ALI TAX TREATY PROJECT, supra note 23, at 56.
340. See id. at 57 (positing that "[a]fter the treaty has been negotiated and ratified, there seems
to be no reason to attribute any more weight to subsequent administrative interpretation than would
be the case with respect to a corresponding legislative enactment"). Of course, subsequent
legislation (and to the extent discussed in the next subpart, Treasury regulations) might override an
existing treaty obligation, but overriding a treaty is a different issue from interpreting a treaty. See
infra subpart V(B).
341. For a more thorough discussion of the treaty-interpretation issues raised by NatWest, see
Reinhold & Harrington, supra note 22, at 192, 192-203 (examining "the NatWest decision in light
of the textual, contextual, and purposive analytical approaches" toward treaty interpretation).
342. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest), 512 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
343. As noted in note 324, supra, the Government failed to press the Article 3(2) definitional
argument, which might have resulted in a more favorable standard. See Reinhold & Harrington,
supra note 22, at 204.
344. NatWest, 512 F.3d at 1353.
345. Id. at 1359.
346. Id. at 1355-59.
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have been aware), as well as evidence regarding the contemporaneous under-
standing of the parties.347 Of particular relevance for purposes of this
discussion, the court rejected the application of the regulation stating that it is
"entitled to minimal deference where it contravenes the treaty's language and
negotiation history, as well as the contemporaneous expectations of the
United Kingdom. 3 48 Accordingly, where a court finds evidence of the mu-
tual understanding of the treaty parties-either in the plain language of the
treaty or other relevant supplementary materials under general treaty-
interpretation principles-there is little role for a subsequently enacted
Treasury regulation in interpreting a treaty, 349 at least outside of the context
of treaty provisions, such as Articles 3(2) and 23, that explicitly defer to in-
ternal law.
As a side issue, a question might arise as to the proper time frame in
which to determine whether a regulation is promulgated subsequent to a
treaty. The facts in NatWest were complicated in this regard, given that the
treaty at issue was signed on December 31, 1975, successive diplomatic
notes and protocols were exchanged over the next few years, and instruments
of ratification were not exchanged until March 25, 1980. 350 The regulation at
issue was proposed on February 27, 1980 (a few weeks before the treaty's
instruments were exchanged), and was adopted on December 30, 1980 (after
the treaty's instruments were exchanged). 351 The Federal Circuit in NatWest,
in ascertaining the mutual understanding of the parties, focused its attention
on the date the treaty was signed (December 31, 1975)352 and ignored other
developments-including the proposal of the regulations and other conduct
consistent with that regulation-that occurred after the 1975 signing but be-
fore the instruments of ratification were exchanged in 1980 .
353
The court's narrow focus on the date of signing, to the exclusion of
subsequent developments that occurred prior to the exchange of instruments,
is inconsistent with the rationale in Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
Stuart. As discussed above, Justice Brennan, in interpreting the 1942 U.S.-
Canada income tax treaty, referred to the Senate floor debate on the treaty to
support the Court's interpretation of the treaty language.354 In response to
347. Id. at 1359.
348. Id.
349. The related question of whether a regulation could override a treaty provision is discussed
briefly in subpart V(B), infra.
350. Reinhold & Harrington, supra note 22, at 174. The United Kingdom executed its
instrument of ratification on March 10, 1980. Id. at 199 n. 179.
351. NatWest, 512 F.3d at 1351.
352. Id. at 1359 ("[T]he Government fails to adequately support its contention that this conduct
[including the adoption of the regulation] is consistent with the expectations of the United States
and the United Kingdom when the 1975 Treaty was signed." (emphasis added)).
353. Id. at 1351. As Reinhold and Harrington observed, this focus on the date of signing
"tilt[ed] the balance in favor of the United Kingdom's perspective." Reinhold & Harrington, supra
note 22, at 204, 203-04.
354. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
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Justice Scalia's objection to the use of preratification Senate debate to ascer-
tain the mutual intent and expectations of the treaty parties, 355 Justice
Brennan claimed that the use of the Senate debates is consistent with a con-
tract model because the debates are public and therefore are within the
"earshot of proposed treaty partners. 3 56  Implicit in Justice Brennan's
reasoning is an assumption that the treaty partner, if it "heard" something in
the Senate debate that it disagreed with, could raise an objection before ex-
changing instruments of ratification with the United States. As discussed
previously, the validity of this view is subject to significant criticism.
Nonetheless, if a court were to follow the Stuart dicta, it might consider
developments occurring between the date of signing and the date instruments
of ratification are exchanged, including regulations such as those at issue in
Nat West.357
While the NatWest court's focus on the shared understanding of the
parties is correct as a matter of law, the case also illustrates the significant
practical difficulties that arise in applying this standard. A recent analysis by
Richard Reinhold and Catherine Harrington illustrates many of these
difficulties.35 8 In particular, tax treaties often utilize "generalized 'treaty
speak' that has relatively little connotative value standing alone. 359  The
analysis observed that, notwithstanding the court's assertion regarding the
plain meaning of the language at issue, "more than one good-faith reading
seems eminently reasonable. 36 °
Under such circumstances, if a court were to acknowledge that the plain
meaning of the text was ambiguous, greater pressure would be placed on the
supplementary materials. Here, too, Reinhold and Harrington noted the
flexibility that courts exercise in considering supplementary materials,
concluding that the NatWest court's decisions as to which materials were
relevant "tilt[ed] the balance in favor of the United Kingdom's
perspective., 361 These criticisms do not necessarily mean that the NatWest
case was incorrectly decided. Rather, they demonstrate the practical diffi-
culty of applying general principles of treaty interpretation in the intersection
of two countries' complex tax regimes.
355. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
356. Id. at 368 n.7.
357. This approach would not change the conclusion discussed earlier that regulations
promulgated "subsequent" to a treaty have little relevance under general treaty-interpretation
principles. Rather, it merely would redefine preratification regulations as forming part of the
mutual understanding of the treaty partners.
358. Reinhold & Harrington, supra note 22.
359. Id. at 203 (comparing the technical language at issue in NatWest to more ordinary
language at issue in some other cases).
360. Id.
361. Id. at 204; cf Schoenblum, supra note 6, subpart V(A) (observing that with respect to the
interpretation of estate-tax treaties, "[w]hile the judges may actually believe they are applying
established principles of treaty interpretation, the same open-ended and contradictory principles
could have been applied to produce a different result").
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These practical concerns might provide the strongest (although still
circumscribed) case for a court to give some deference to a subsequently
promulgated regulation issued by the "agenc[y] charged with [the] negotia-
tion and enforcement ' 362 of tax treaties (outside of circumstances, such as
Articles 3(2) and 23, that more clearly contemplate such use). As discussed
earlier, tax treaties bridge and attempt to reconcile the complex, technical,
and ever-changing internal tax regimes of the two treaty partners.363 Given
these complexities, it is not surprising that the treaties cannot specifically ad-
dress every tax issue that exists at the time of negotiation, let alone anticipate
future developments in global business structures and changes in the
countries' tax laws.
While the plain language of the tax treaties undoubtedly resolves the
364vast majority of circumstances faced by taxpayers, it is not unreasonable to
assume that a certain number of issues will not be resolved by the plain
language, particularly as business structures and transactions become more
complex. Indeed, even in the context of relatively simple language in nontax
treaty settings, Supreme Court Justices have disagreed as to whether or not a
word was ambiguous.365
Under such circumstances, courts should be willing to acknowledge that
certain tax treaty language does not necessarily provide a clear answer.
Moreover, courts should be willing to acknowledge that traditional supple-
mentary materials, such as the OECD Commentary and the limited evidence
available from the negotiations, might not readily demonstrate a shared un-
derstanding. Under such circumstances, a court should be willing to give at
least some weight to the Treasury regulation, taking into consideration other
factors, such as the general purpose of the relevant provision of the treaty and
the unilateral views of the other country. This argument is particularly strong
when a validly authorized and promulgated regulation prevents what might
otherwise be an abuse of the purpose of a treaty-e.g., by preventing the al-
lowance of double nontaxation.
366
While this standard is, admittedly, vague, the main point is to suggest
that courts should be willing to acknowledge that, in limited circumstances,
the principal sources for ascertaining mutual intent will not resolve complex
tax issues under a treaty. In those limited circumstances, Treasury's formal
determination-which takes into consideration Treasury's view of relevant
statutory law, Treasury's role in overseeing the tax treaty network, and also
362. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
364. After all, the vast majority of situations involve the routine application of established
principles, which are resolved by the taxpayers completing their tax returns or completing the
appropriate paperwork for withholding, with no involvement by the IRS.
365. For a discussion of Haitian Centers Council's interpretation of"return," see supra note 99
and accompanying text.
366. Cf Avi-Yonah, supra note 13 at 77-78 (suggesting that even treaty overrides might be
justifiable in such circumstances).
1130 [Vol. 87:1063
The Limits of Administrative Guidance
public notice and comment-warrants some weight, even though it might not
necessarily reflect the (unknowable or possibly nonexistent) shared under-
standing of the parties on the issue.
B. Administrative Interpretation Versus Override
Even if a regulation is valid under Chevron, a court nonetheless might
find it inapplicable to a treaty under general treaty-interpretation principles
(and under the suggestions set forth in the preceding section).367 Under such
circumstances, it is important to consider one other potential justification for
applying the regulation-the possibility that the Treasury regulation over-
rides the treaty provision and must therefore be applied, notwithstanding its
conflict with the treaty under the foregoing principles. Of course, to the ex-
tent that the regulation is applicable under the interpretation principles
discussed previously, its application would be consistent with the treaty and
would not be viewed as an override.368
As discussed above, Congress has the authority, under the Constitution,
to override a treaty obligation by a subsequent statute. 369 Nonetheless, such
an override would be a violation of the United States' obligations under in-
ternational law, and accordingly, courts generally attempt, if possible, to
interpret statutes in a manner that does not cause an override.37°
Professor Richard Doemberg has provided a thorough analysis of the
extent to which this override authority can be delegated to the Treasury
Department.371  Professor Doernberg, after analyzing the relationship
between treaties and statutes as well as relevant Supreme Court delegation-
doctrine precedent, concludes that "it seems likely that the power to override
treaties can be delegated., 372 However, this delegation is valid only in the
367. In the case of a regulation that might fit within Article 3(2) or 23, a court might find the
regulation inapplicable because the context requires otherwise, while in other circumstances, the
court might find the regulation inapplicable under the general principles of the treaty provision. See
supra section V(A)(2).
368. "[T]here is no override where the treaty contains a provision essentially similar to" Article
3(2) and the change in internal law comports with that provision. OECD TAX TREATY OVERRIDE
REPORT, supra note 123, at R(8)-4. "It cannot have been contemplated that, having once entered
into a treaty, a State would be unable to change definitions of terms used in its domestic law
provided such changes were compatible with the context of the treaty." Id.
369. See supra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
371. See Doernberg, supra note 281, at 534-40. See generally Infanti, Reverse Hybrid, supra
note 125 (questioning the Treasury's authority to override treaties via regulation).
372. Doernberg, supra note 281, at 541; cf RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 272, § 43.07
("Treasury's authority to override earlier, inconsistent treaty obligations through the promulgation
of regulations is open to debate."). For a brief contrary view, see Infanti, Reverse Hybrid, supra
note 125, at 312 ("[A]n aggrieved [taxpayer] might argue that, if a power to change the terms of
existing tax treaties is to be exercised unilaterally by the United States at all, its importance dictates
that it should be exercised only by the duly elected branches of government through the legislative
process established in Article I of the Constitution.").
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narrow circumstances when Congress "issue[s] a clear statement and
provide[s] adequate standards
373 regarding the override. 374
The Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, recently held that certain
Treasury regulations overrode a tax treaty because "[t]he regulations were
issued pursuant to express Congressional authorization and are fully consis-
tent with Congress' statutory scheme. To the extent the regulations abrogate
(if they do at all) any treaty obligation, they only do so at the command and
express authorization of Congress., 375 The Ninth Circuit's (nonprecedential)
standard appears to be more willing to find an administrative override than is
Professor Doernberg, given that it does not require the authorizing legislation
to provide adequate standards regarding the scope of the override authority.
In any event, the opinion's reasoning is of limited usefulness for two reasons
(in addition to its unpublished, nonprecedential nature). First,
notwithstanding the court's finding that there was an "express authorization"
from Congress, the relevant statutory authorization merely stated that the
underlying substantive tax statute, which had general applicability outside of
the treaty context, would override any contrary tax treaty376 -the statute did
not expressly state that regulations interpreting the statute would override an
existing treaty. Second, it is not clear from the facts of the case that the reg-
ulation at issue was inconsistent with the treaty.377
373. Doemberg, supra note 281, at 541.
374. This delegation must be explicit, rather than implicit. Citing Trans World Airlines v.
Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984), Professor Doemberg notes that the Supreme Court is
unwilling to find that a federal statute implicitly overrides a U.S. treaty commitment. Id. at 542.
From this, he concludes that "[i]f Congress cannot implicitly override U.S. treaty commitments, an
administrative agency surely cannot override a treaty based on implicit congressional authority."
Id. Under this standard, the court in NatWest would not have allowed the regulation at issue to
override the treaty result, given that there was no indication that Congress intended-either
explicitly or even implicitly-that the regulations under the relevant Code section would override
treaty obligations.
Professor Doemberg also identifies complications regarding the later-in-time rule, particularly
with respect to treaties that enter into force after the date of the authorizing legislation but before the
promulgation of the regulation. See id. at 544-50 (concluding that the relevant date for determining
later-in-time is the date the authorizing legislation is enacted, not the later date when the treaty is
promulgated).
375. Am. Air Liquide, Inc. v. Comm'r, 2002 WL 1994118, at *724 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2002)
(mem.).
376. See id. (citing a 1988 technical correction providing that a particular statutory amendment
made by 1986 legislation would override the treaty).
377. The taxpayer attempted to invoke former Code § 904(d)(3)(C), which would have given
the taxpayer a more favorable result under the foreign tax credit limitation. See id. at *722-23. On
its face, the favorable statute did not apply to the taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that the
regulation's failure to provide an exception that would have made the statute apply constituted a
violation of the nondiscrimination clause. Id. at *723. The Ninth Circuit, in effect, concluded that
the regulation's failure to provide an exception that would have benefited the taxpayer constituted
an override of the nondiscrimination provision. Id. This conclusion-that Treasury's omission of
an exception from a regulation constitutes a treaty override-seems like a stretch, particularly
because Congress had not explicitly delegated the power to override the treaty in the first place. A
more appropriate approach would have addressed the substantive treaty question-i.e., was the
nondiscrimination clause violated-before looking to the override question. The Tax Court had
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Assuming the standard set forth by Professor Doernberg applies,
regulations promulgated under the general authority of Code § 7805(a)
378
would not meet the standard and thus would not override a contrary provi-
sion of a treaty. That Code section does not provide a clear statement of
Congress's intent to override a treaty (and accordingly, also does not provide
clear standards for doing SO). 3 79 In contrast, regulations promulgated under
specific grants of regulatory authority would have to be analyzed on a case-
by-case basis.38°
In 2007 the House of Representatives passed the Farm, Nutrition, and
Bioenergy Act of 2007,381 which contained a provision that, had it been
enacted, would have satisfied Professor Doemberg's criteria. The provision
would have prevented foreign multinational corporations from claiming
treaty benefits for certain deductible payments routed through related parties
382in treaty countries. By its very nature, the provision was intended to apply
notwithstanding conflicting provisions of existing treaties, and accordingly,
courts would have applied it to override treaties.383
More interestingly for purposes of this discussion, the provision
contained an express delegation of authority for Treasury to promulgate
regulations "as are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this
section," including regulations addressing two specifically identified issues
involving the treatment of members of foreign-controlled groups of
entities. 384 Given the express and sole purpose of the statute-to deny treaty
taken this approach in ruling against the taxpayer, finding that there was no nondiscrimination
violation. See Am. Air Liquide, Inc. v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 23, 27 (2001), aff'd, 2002 WL 1994118
(9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2002) (mem.).
378. For a discussion of general rulemaking authority under I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000), see supra
notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
379. See Infanti, Reverse Hybrid, supra note 125, at 312 (suggesting that § 7805 only grants
authority to the Treasury Department to promulgate rules and regulations and does not grant the
power to override a treaty).
380. As an example, in NatWest, the Federal Circuit held that Treasury regulations regarding
the calculation of a bank branch's interest expenses were not applicable because of the U.S.-U.K.
treaty. Nat'l Westminster Bank, PLC v. United States (NatWest), 512 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
2008). For a discussion of NatWest, see supra notes 341-49 and accompanying text. The
Government, after losing the treaty-interpretation issue, did not argue that the regulations overrode
the treaty. Such an argument would have been unsuccessful under Professor Doemberg's test
because there was no clear delegation of treaty-override authority.
381. H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. § 12001 (2007) (as passed by the House on July 27, 2007). The
relevant provision, which was used as a revenue offset to a farm bill, originated in a bill introduced
by Rep. Lloyd Doggett. See H.R. 3160, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
382. H.R. 2419, § 12001.
383. For a discussion of general circumstances when federal itatutes can override treaties, see
supra notes 123-29.
384. See H.R. 2419, § 12001(a) (proposing the addition of I.R.C. § 894(d)(5)). The bill
specifically contemplated regulations that would provide for:
. [T]he treatment of two or more persons as members of a foreign controlled
group of entities if such persons would be the common parent of such group
if treated as one corporation, and
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benefits under certain circumstances-this authorization appears to be a spe-
cific delegation of authority for Treasury to promulgate regulations that
would override a treaty. Moreover, it also appears to provide adequate stan-
dards for their exercise, particularly in the situations involving foreign-
controlled groups that are specifically targeted in the statute's grant of regu-
latory authority. Accordingly, it would satisfy the standards delineated by
Professor Doemberg. Because of concerns about the ramifications of a
sweeping treaty override in this area,385 the provision ultimately was dropped
from the farm bill.386
VI. Conclusion
Tax treaties play an important role in resolving the complex interactions
between different countries' internal tax regimes in an increasingly global
economy. Taxpayers, tax administrators, and courts must sometimes strug-
gle to interpret these treaties, particularly as multinational business structures
and cross-border transactions become increasingly sophisticated. This
process raises important questions regarding the interaction of international
law, constitutional law, and administrative law.
The Treasury Department's traditional approach to treaty interpretation,
which relies on the ad hoc modifications of various technical explanations,
has several shortcomings in these ever-changing circumstances. In
particular, it fails to create guidance that courts will rely on when interpreting
treaties, yet it provides taxpayers with flexibility to take aggressive reporting
positions.
The Treasury Department should, instead, focus its efforts on providing
guidance in the form of Treasury regulations. Regulations can have their
greatest influence in the context of those treaty provisions, such as
Articles 3(2) and 23, that explicitly defer to U.S. law as it may change from
time to time. However, even in the context of other treaty articles, postratifi-
cation Treasury regulations need not necessarily be disregarded under
general treaty-interpretation principles. Under these principles, the
regulations' applicability will depend, at least in part, on the willingness of
* [T]he treatment of any member of a foreign controlled group of entities as
the common parent of such group if such treatment is appropriate taking into
account the economic relationships among such entities.
Id. § 12001(d)(5) (formatting added).
385. For a discussion of the consequences of a treaty override, see supra notes 130-35.
386. See generally West, supra note 47, at 1165 (describing the negative reaction to a proposed
treaty override "not only from the private sector, but also from the chair and ranking member of the
Senate Finance Committee"). A modified version of this provision was included in a tax-reform bill
sponsored by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Charles Rangel. See Tax Reduction
and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 100th Cong. § 3204(a) (2007) (eliminating the application of
the provision if the foreign multinational parent was itself eligible for treaty benefits); see also
STAFF OF H. WAYS & MEANS COMM., 100TH CONG., STAFF SUMMARY: H.R. 3970, TAX
REDUCTION AND REFORM ACT OF 2007 (Comm. Print 2007) (describing differences between H.R.
2419 and H.R. 2970 provisions).
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courts to acknowledge that, due to the complex nature of tax treaties as a
bridge between two countries' complex tax regimes, in some circumstances
neither the plain text of the treaty nor other supplementary treaty materials
will reveal a shared understanding between the parties regarding the applica-
tion of the treaty to certain situations. Under these limited circumstances,
regulations might provide a mechanism whereby the Treasury Department
can influence the application of tax treaties to increasingly complex interna-
tional transactions, while at the same time not violating the United States'
obligations under its treaties.
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